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ESSAYS ON SOCIAL INSURANCE
Athanasios C. Thanopoulos, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2009
In the rst essay, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of an unfunded social security system. We
do so using an overlapping generations economy wherein agents have self-control preferences,
face mortality risk, individual income risk, and borrowing constraints. Given our specication
of preferences, unfunded social security helps reduce the agentstemptation to consume in
every period; consequently, the welfare costs it otherwise entails are substantially mitigated.
While both social security and self-control when considered separately reduce welfare, their
combination renders this e¤ect considerably less severe. Moreover, if the cost of resisting
temptation is very high, the introduction of social security might even improve welfare.
In the second essay I use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium overlapping genera-
tions model to examine the relevance of unfunded social security in an environment where
both CRRA and self-control agents co-exist. I identify conditions under which the exis-
tence of CRRA agents in the economy makes self-control agents better-o¤. I, therefore,
conclude that temptation prevalence across individuals in the economy and temptation in-
tensity within individuals can be considered to be substitutes in reducing the welfare cost
associated with unfunded social security for self control agents.
In the third essay we analyze a fully funded social security system under the assump-
tion that agents face temptation issues. Agents are required to save through individually
managed Personal Security Accounts without, and with mandatory annuitization. When the
analysis is restricted to CRRA preferences our results are congruent with the literature in
indicating that the complete elimination of social security is the reform scenario that max-
imizes welfare. However, when self control preferences are introduced, and as the intensity
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of self control becomes progressively more severe the "social security elimination" scenario
loses ground very rapidly. In fact, in the case of very severe temptation the elimination of
social security becomes the least desirable alternative. Under the light of the above nd-
ings, any reform proposal regarding the social security system should consider departures
from standard preferences to preference specications suitable for dealing with preference
reversals.
v
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation focuses on the study of various institutional arrangements pertaining to so-
cial insurance. The broad objective is the investigation of the welfare implications of di¤erent
social security settings, pursued by examining competing assumptions about agentsprefer-
ences in both homogeneous and heterogeneous with respect to agentspreferences economies.
The basic building block is a stochastic variant of an overlapping generations model (pio-
neered by Auerbach & Kotliko¤, 1987[3]) with long but nite-lived individuals who face
random life-span and unemployment risk. More specically, this model is modied along
two principal dimensions:
(A) It is postulated that agents have self-control preferences, that is, at every period they
run into the temptation to consume their entire wealth. As a consequence, agents featuring
self-control preferences save at a lower rate than standard (CRRA) agents, in spite of being
just as concerned with lifetime utility as their CRRA counterparts. The consequences of
this behavioral assumption are thoroughly examined on both a PAYGO and a fully/partially
funded social security system.
(B) In a model of unfunded social security, type heterogeneity is introduced by assuming
that both self-control and CRRA agents co-exist in the economy.
The main results obtained are summarized in the following:
The central issue addressed in the rst essay "Social Security and Self-Control Prefer-
ences" (co-authored with Cagri S. Kumru) is the welfare improving potential of unfunded
social security under the assumption that agents have self-control preferences. Thus far, the
relevant literature has echoed the concern that a PAYGO system can never be shown to be
welfare improving, by means of any possible variation of our baseline model. For the sake of
comparability with the literature, we use a variant of the same -industry standard- baseline
1
model, but we assume that agents feature self-control preferences. We nd that PAYGO
social security helps reduce the agents temptation to consume in every period. In stark
contrast with the existing literature, the welfare losses are substantially mitigated. Remark-
ably, while both unfunded social security and self-control when considered separately reduce
welfare, their combination renders their joint e¤ect considerably less severe. Moreover, if
the cost of resisting temptation is very high, the introduction of social security might even
improve welfare.
The second essay "Temptation Prevalence and Unfunded Social Security" introduces het-
erogeneity in preferences in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium overlapping generations
model in order to examine the relevance of unfunded social security in an environment where
both CRRA and self-control agents co-exist. Conditions (analogous to those in the rst es-
say) under which the existence of CRRA agents in the economy makes self-control agents
better-o¤are identied. Therefore, amixed economy where there exist simultaneously agents
with either CRRA or self-control preferences, allows to examine the extent to which "tempta-
tion prevalence" across individuals and temptation severity/intensity within individuals are
substitutes in o¤setting the adverse e¤ects of unfunded social security. In that sense, this
model nests the model in the rst essay and provides a richer perspective over the mechanics
of the interaction between unfunded social security and self-control preferences.
The main ndings in the second essay indicate that, in an economy featuring both CRRA
and self-control individuals, social security can be welfare improving for the latter, provided
that the temptation those agents face is su¢ ciently severe. Moreover, the presence of CRRA
agents lowers the documented in the literature threshold of self-control intensity that is
required for social security to benet self-control individuals in an "all-self-control" environ-
ment. This is due to the fact that the presence of CRRA agents slows down the capital
decumulation process in the economy and mitigates the welfare cost that temptation elimi-
nation entails for their self-control counterparts.
It is worth noting that as these essays are calibrated to the US Economy, a notoriously
dynamically e¢ cient economy (Abel et al, 1989[1]) one should expect to see the above wel-
fare improving results even more pronounced when calibrating to dynamically ine¢ cient
economies.
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Having investigated the welfare improving potential of the aforemetioned assumptions
on PAYGO social security, the third essay "Social Security Reform and Temptation" (co-
authored with Cagri S. Kumru) emerges naturally as the concluding step of this dissertation.
The impact of self-control preferences is investigated on a fully-funded social security set-
ting in which agents save through Personal Security Accounts (PSAs), without, and with
mandatory annuitization. Such a model allows to assess the welfare-enhancing potential of
mandatory annuitization of accumulated PSA wealth at retirement. When the analysis is
restricted to CRRA preferences the results in this essay are congruent with the literature in
indicating that the complete elimination of social security is the reform scenario that max-
imizes welfare. However, when self-control preferences are introduced, and as the intensity
of self-control becomes progressively more severe the "social security elimination" scenario
loses ground very rapidly. In fact, in the case of very severe temptation the elimination of
social security becomes the least desirable alternative. Under the light of the above nd-
ings, any reform proposal regarding the social security system should consider departures
from standard preferences to preference specications suitable for dealing with preference
reversals.
There are some important caveats that the reader of this dissertation should be aware
of:
 In this dissertation I abstract from considering the consequences of aggregate (or social)
risk.
 In evaluating di¤erent policies I abstract from the extent to which they serve as a redis-
tributive mechanism. In some parts of my work (mainly chapter 2) I do use a concave
benet function (which implies the aforementioned redistributive role) but in the major-
ity of cases, I evaluate my policies using an unbounded benets function. A political-
economy model would be more suitable to deal with these e¤ects properly.
 I abstract from examining any transitional dynamics. Instead I only focus on steady
state analysis.
3
2.0 SOCIAL SECURITY AND SELF-CONTROL PREFERENCES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
1The economic benets of an unfunded social security system are largely summarized in pro-
viding intra- and inter-generational risk sharing. Still, this is accomplished at the signicant
cost of encouraging early retirement, while it also entails very severe distortions in agents
labor supply and private savings decisions. The latter can be readily shown in an overlapping
generations model where consumers inelastically supply labor (Diamond (1965)[7]): Since
social security redistributes income from the young to the old generation by imposing a tax
on current workersincome (payroll tax) -i.e. from a generation with low propensity to con-
sume to a generation with a high propensity to consume- it lowers savings and consequently,
the steady state capital stock. In addition, Auerbach & Kotliko¤ (1987)[3], Imrohoroglu et
al. (1995), and Hugget & Ventura (1999)[21], by using a large-scale overlapping generations
model, show that an unfunded social security systems distortions in the amount of labor
supply and capital accumulation exceed its benets and hence its existence in an economy
reduces overall welfare.
Interestingly, the redistribution mechanism of social security and its induced between-
and-within generations allocation of risk is not the only factor that positively a¤ects welfare:
Potential idiosyncrasies in agents preferences highlight yet another extremely important
source of ambivalence with regard to the welfare implications of social security. Many stud-
ies, both theoretical and empirical have argued on the welfare gains that can be accrued
thanks to social security when households lack the foresight to save adequately for their re-
tirement. In particular, Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)[24] provide a concise review of the relevant
1This chapter is based on joint work with Cagri S. Kumru
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literature, as well as an interesting discussion of the debate as to whether myopia is indeed
empirically identied from e.g. unforeseen events and other factors that cause a sudden drop
in consumption at retirement.
It is well documented in the experimental economics literature that subjects facing inter-
temporal choice problems often exhibit preference reversals, or that their preferences feature
some kind of time inconsistency (Gul and Pesendorfer (2001[17], 2004a[18], 2004b)[19]). In
a seminal paper Phelps & Pollak (1968)[31] introduce an intertemporal framework involv-
ing quasi-hyperbolic discounting (in lieu of exponential discounting) and utilize it in order
to study intergenerational altruism (we shall henceforth refer to the preference structure
developed by Phelps & Pollak (1968)[31] as "time-inconsistent preferences").2
In a recent study that enhances considerably the insights found in Feldstein (1985)[8],
Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)[24] investigate the welfare e¤ects of unfunded social security in an
economy populated by agents with time-inconsistent preferences who su¤er from inability to
commit to future actions and hence, save inadequately. In Imrohoroglu et al.[24], there is a
government that engages in savings on behalf of the quasi-hyperbolic discounters through the
social security system. Their main ndings are that: (1) quasi-hyperbolic discounters incur
substantial welfare costs because of their time-inconsistent behavior, (2) to maintain old-age
consumption, social security is not a good substitute for a perfect commitment technology,
and (3) there is little room for social security in a world of quasi-hyperbolic discounters.
In spite of their theoretical appeal in providing an alternative that adequately explains
observed patterns of behavior, quasi-hyperbolic discounting models entail a non-recursive
structure that renders them computationally intractable. This is because quasi-hyperbolic
discounting structure does not allow a desire for commitment to ones future actions.
Gul & Pesendorfer (2004a)[18] choose a di¤erent approach in their attempt to explain
preference reversals. They develop self-control preferences that depend on what an agent
actually consumes on one hand, and what would be the level of consumption that would
explain the experimental phenomenon, on the other.3 To this purpose, they introduce self-
2Laibson (1997)[30], Diamond and Koszegi (2003)[8], Krusell et al. (2002a)[26], and Krusell and Smith
(2003)[28] analyze various macroeconomic models by using time-inconsistent preferences.
3We will henceforth use the terms "Gul and Pesendorfer preferences" and "Self-Control preferences" inter-
changeably. It is worth noting that "Gul and Pesendorfer" preferences is not the only available specication
for self-control preferences in the literature.
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control and temptation utilities, concepts that capture the trade o¤ between the temptation
to consume on the one hand, and the long-run self interest of the agent on the other. Under
certain rationality assumptions, preferences over sets of actions are consistent with exper-
imental evidence. In stark contrast to time-inconsistent preferences however, self-control
preferences are time-consistent. In particular, it is assumed that the preferences governing
behavior at time t di¤er from the preferences over continuation plans implied by the agents
rst period preferences and choices prior to period t. In contrast, self-control preferences
may already exhibit a desire for commitment.4
In this paper we explore the role of an unfunded social security system in a setting where
agents have self-control preferences. To this purpose, we develop an overlapping generation
model in which agents live up to the real age of 85. The economy consists of three sectors:
agents, rms and a government. Agents have idiosyncratic income and face a mortality risk.
They work up to the real age of 65 whenever they have an opportunity to work. When unem-
ployed or retired, they are compensated by the government by unemployment insurance or
retirement benets respectively. In addition, they maintain positive asset holdings in order
to insure against idiosyncratic income risks and low old-age consumption. Moreover, we as-
sume that private credit markets (including annuitiesmarkets) are closed. The government
collects unemployment insurance and payroll taxes from workers to the purpose of nancing
its activities.
We compute the steady state equilibria under di¤erent social security replacement rates
by calibrating our model economy to the U.S. economy. From previous studies we know that
if an economy is populated by agents with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences
i.e. neither facing a commitment nor a temptation problem, the introduction of an unfunded
social security system reduces welfare (Imrohoroglu et al. (1995[22] and 2003[24])). The
reason is that the insurance benet of an unfunded social security system is dominated
by its negative e¤ect on agents savings decisions. We also know that if an economy is
populated by agents with time-inconsistent preferences, the introduction of social security
still reduces welfare, although it provides an additional benet as a commitment apparatus.
4See DeJong and Ripoll (2007)[4] and Krusell et al. (2002b)[27] for applications of self-control preferences
in various macroeconomic models.
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The reason is that the latter benet along with the insurance benet are dominated by social
securitys negative e¤ect on agentssavings decisions (Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)[24]). Several
interesting insights obtain in our setting: Social security indeed tends to reduce welfare.
However, it is worth mentioning that social security is less detrimental to welfare under self-
control preferences than it is under CRRA preferences. In addition, if the cost of resisting
the temptation is very severe, the introduction of social security might even improve welfare.
Controlling for all other factors we infer that this is due to our specication of preferences:
Agents with self-control preferences face no commitment problem. Nonetheless, the cost of
resisting the temptation associated with the exertion of self-control becomes very severe as
wealth increases. In turn, this may impair overall savings in an economy. In our environment,
an unfunded social security system has no role as a commitment apparatus but might play
a role as a device to decrease available wealth when agents make their consumption-savings
decisions.
We identify the underpinnings of our results with the impact social security has on
agentsmarginal propensity to consume. In the "traditional" setting where agents have
CRRA preferences, the young have a low marginal propensity to consume while the old
have a high marginal propensity to consume. This relation preserves a high rate of capital
accumulation through higher savings during the young age. In contrast, in our environment
the young face temptations that operate as impediments to their propensity to (privately)
save. Alternatively, the agentsmarginal propensity to consume is not as low as it is in the
case of CRRA preferences. Accordingly, the cost of resisting temptation increases with the
level of wealth. Inevitably, social security by being a mechanism that is bound to deprive
agents from early consumption accomplishes at the same time to reduce the cost associated
with the exertion of self-control and consequently to partially o¤set its adverse e¤ect on
welfare. Note that this e¤ect is absent in environments where preferences do not allow
agents the option to exert self-control as in Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)[24].5
5Diamond (2004)[3] and Diamond et al. (2005)[4] argue that the current unfunded social security system
does not need radical reform and it is enough to put the system on stronger nancial footing while improving
the benet structure at the same time. They state further that mandated savings make sense since many
workers would not save enough for their old-age consumption. Our results are in line with those of Diamond
in the following sense: When individuals are endowed with temptation, they substantially save less due to
the burden of resisting the temptation. The current social security system helps agents to overcome the
temptation problem and hence, the welfare cost of the system is not very large.
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2.2 GUL & PESENDORFER SELF-CONTROL PREFERENCES
An alternative way of modelling self-control issues is a class of utility functions identied by
Gul and Pesendorfer (2004a)[18]. They provide a time-consistent model that addresses the
preference reversals that motivate the time inconsistency literature.
Consider a set B of consumption lotteries, and a two-period setting. Gul and Pesendorfer
(2004a)[18] have shown that under a specic assumption on choice sets (set betweenness)
combined with other standard axioms that yield the expected utility function U(:) dened
as
U(B) := max
p2B
Z
(u (c) + v (c)) dp max
p2B
Z
v(c)dp
represents the preference relation implied by the above axioms. The function u(:) represents
the agents ranking over alternatives when he is committed to a single choice while when he is
not committed to a single choice, his welfare is a¤ected by the temptation utility represented
by v(:). Note that when B is a singleton, the terms involving v(:) will vanish leaving only
the u(:) terms to represent preferences. However, if it is e.g. B = fc; c0g with u(c) > u(c0) an
agent will succumb to the temptation (that is, he will pick the commitment utility - reducing
alternative, c0) only if the latter provides a su¢ ciently high temptation utility v(:) in the
second period and o¤sets the fact that u(c) > u(c0), i.e. when
u(c0) + v(c0) > u(c) + v(c)
In this case the agent wishes he had only c as the available alternative, since under the
presence of c0, he cannot resist the temptation of choosing the latter.
When the above inequality is reversed, however, the agent will pick c in the second
period, albeit at a cost of v(c0) v(c):6 We call the latter di¤erence the cost of self-control.
6To see that, note that for B = fc; c0g and u(c) > u(c0) we would have that
U(fc; c0g) = max
~c2fc;c0g
(u(~c) + v(~c))  max
~c2fc;c0g
v(~c)
= u(c) + v(c)  v(c0)
and since by assumption v(c0) > v(c) this means that
U(fc; c0g) = u(c)  [v(c0)  v(c)]
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In terms of the setting in the present paper, in every period a household faces a consump-
tion - savings problem. Each period, our agents make a decision that yields a consumption
for that period and wealth for the next. However, each period these agents face the temp-
tation to consume all of their wealth, and hence, resisting to this temptation results in a
self-control-related cost.
Under standard assumptions combined with the multi-period version of set between-
ness,we can represent self-control preferences in a recursive form for the purposes of our T
period model which is presented in the next section.
The main di¤erence between self-control preferences and time-inconsistent preferences
is that the former do not imply dynamic inconsistency. Preferences are perfectly consis-
tent. Agents can perfectly commit to future actions and do not regret their past actions.
Moreover, self-control preferences allow agents to exercise self-control, an option not existing
in time-inconsistent preferences. The di¤erence in discounting is the source of preference
reversals in the case of time-inconsistent preferences while it also explains why agents nd
immediate rewards tempting. Instead, Gul and Pesendorfers self-control preferences assume
that agents maximize a utility function that is a compromisebetween the standard utility
(or commitmentutility) and a temptationutility. Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)[24] consid-
ered a setting similar to ours and analyzed the consequences of time-inconsistent preferences
while we follow the self-control paradigm in a similar nite-horizon setting. Gul and Pe-
sendorfer (2004a)[18] showed that for nite decision problems a time-inconsistency model
can be re-interpreted as a temptation model. In light of that we consider our work as an
extension of Imrohoroglu et al. in that direction. The purpose of doing so is to check, inter
alia, if our results encompass the ones of Imrohoroglu et al.[24] or if the fact that agents in
our setting are capable of exercising self-control (an option not available in Imrohoroglu et
al.[24]), alters their ndings substantially.
i.e. the utility of the choice c gets penalized by a positive number, the cost of self-control.Note that in
the case v(c0) < v(c) i.e. when there is congruence of the utility functions as to which alternative is the best,
there is no temptation issue anymore; c is chosen at no penalty since the v(:) terms in U(fc; c0g) cancel out.
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2.3 A MODEL OF SOCIAL SECURITY
The model we consider in this section is quite standard in the social security literature. In
particular, our model closely follows that of Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)[24].
2.3.1 The Environment
We consider a discrete time, stationary overlapping generations economy. Each period a
new generation is born. Agents live a maximum of T periods. The population grows at a
constant rate n. All agents face a probability (st) of surviving from age t 1 to t conditional
on surviving up to age t   1: Since the economy is stationary, age t agents constitute a
fraction t of the population at any given date. The cohort shares (ftgTt=1) are given by
t+1 =
tst+1
1 + n
;
where their sum is normalized to 1.
2.3.2 Preferences
Agents have self-control preferences. In every period they face the temptation to consume
their entire wealth. Resisting temptation creates a self-control cost which is absent in
the models with CRRA and time-inconsistent preferences. We follow Gul & Pesendorfer
(2004a)[18] and DeJong & Ripoll (2007)[4] and model self-control preferences recursively.
Let W (x) denote the maximized value of the expected discounted objective function with
state x. The utility function of an agent is as follows:
W (x) = max
c
fu(c) + v(c) + EW (x0)g  max
c
v(c); (2.1)
where E is the expectation operator; u(:) and v(:) are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions; 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor; c is commitment consumption; c is tempta-
tion consumption; and x0 denotes next period state variable. As in the section above, u(:)
represents the momentary utility function and v(:) represents temptation. In particular,
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v(c) max
c
v(c) denotes the disutility of choosing consumption c instead of c. The concavity
or convexity of v(:) is quite important for our analysis7.
The momentary utility and convex temptation functions take the following forms,
u(c) =
c1    1
1   (2.2)
and
v(c) = 
c

: (2.3)
respectively.
For the balanced growth rate considerations, the concave utility function is chosen as
follows:
v(c) = u(c): (2.4)
In the specication above, higher values of the scale parameter ( > 0) imply an increase
in the share of the temptation utility, i.e. a higher  increases the importance of current
consumption for an agent. The momentary utility function u(:) features constant relative
risk aversion.
2.3.3 Budget Constraints
The exogenously given mandatory retirement age is t. Agents who are younger than age t
face a stochastic employment opportunity. Agents that nd a chance to work, inelastically
supply one unit of labor.8 We denote the employment state by e 2 f0; 1g where 0 and 1
denote unemployment and employment states respectively. The employment state follows
a rst order Markov process. Transition probabilities between current employment state e
and next period employment state e0 are denoted by the 2 2 matrix (e0; e) = [k0k] where
k0; k = 0; 1 and k0k = Prfe0 = k0je = kg.
An employed agent earns wt where w denotes the wage rate in terms of the consumption
good and t denotes the e¢ ciency index of an age t agent. If an agent is at the unemployment
7Notice that if v(:) is convex, we need to make sure that v(:)+u(:) is stricly concave. In particular,  > 0,
 > 1 and 0 <  < =(c+1c 2) guarantee that u(:) is concave, v(:) is convex and u(:) + v(:) is strictly
concave. When v(:) is concave, one should show that W (:) is strictly concave.
8Adding labor-leisure choice into the model requires the modication of preferences in a way that agents
are not only tempted by current consumption but also by current leisure.
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state, he receives unemployment insurance benet equal to the fraction of employed wage
(wt) where  is the unemployment insurance replacement ratio.
Agents retire at age t and receive a lump-sum social security benet b. The social
security benet b is dened as a fraction  of an average life time employed income, which
is independent of an agents employment history:
b =
8<: 0 for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1;Pt 1t=1 wt
t 1 for t = t
; t + 1; :::; T .
The disposable income of an agent at age t can be written as:
qt =
8>>><>>>:
(1   s   u)wt for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1; if e = 1;
wt for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1; if e = 0;
b for t = t; t + 1; :::; T .
In the specication above  s and u represent the social security tax rate and the unemploy-
ment insurance tax rate respectively.
We assume away private insurance market against the employment risk and private
annuities market against the uncertain life span.9 The only available device to smooth
consumption across ones lifetime is the accumulation of assets in terms of physical capital.
Agents cannot hold negative assets at any period.10 Since death is certain at T and there is
no bequest motive, the borrowing constraint can be stated as:118<: at  0 for t = 1; :::; T   1;at = 0 for t = T:
9Although an annuity market exists in the U.S., it is very thin (Imrohoroglu, 1995 [22]). Hence, our
assumption seems innocuous. In our model, social security partially fullls the role of missing annuities
market (it can be considered as mandatory annuitization). Diamond et al. (2005) [3] analyze thoroughly
the relationship between annuities and individual welfare. They shows that full annuitization of wealth is
optimal under certain conditions.
10In other words, an agent faces a borrowing (or liquidity) constraint. There are two main reasons justifying
this assumption: First, our desire for a careful numerical comparison of our results with those in the existing
literature in which this assumption is a standard one. Second, constraining agents from borrowing against
their future income induces an additional boost in (private) savings for precautionary purposes, as long as
agents may be/remain unemployed with a positive probability. If we relaxed this constraint, the ability to
borrow would lower agentsmarginal propensity to save (for precautionary reasons). This would, in turn,
render the e¤ects of self-control and ability to borrow against future income highly correlated and hard to
tell apart. As a result, the e¤ect of social security on savings due to self-control would not be identiable
11Allowing a bequest motive changes the welfare implications of social security. Fuster et al. (2003) [15]
perform a welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework and show that steady state welfare
increases with social security.
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If agents in this economy die before age T , their remaining assets will be distributed to
all of the survivors in a lump-sum fashion. Let  denote the equal amount of accidental
bequests distributed to all remaining members of the society:
 =
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(a; e)(1  st+1)at(a; e); (2.5)
where (a; e) is the set of age dependent, time independent measure of agents.
Hence, we can write the budget constraint of an agent as follows:
at + ct = (1 + r)at 1 + qt +  (2.6)
and
at + ct = (1 + r)at 1 + qt + ; (2.7)
where r is the rate of return from the asset holdings.
2.3.4 Production Function
Firms have access to a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that produces
output (Y ) by using labor input (L = 0:94
t 1P
t=1
tt ) and capital input (K) which is rented
from households:
Y = F (K;L) = AKL(1 ); (2.8)
where A represents the state of technology;  2 (0; 1) is the capitals share of output.
Dening the capital-labor ratio as K
L
, we can write the production function in the intensive
form as follows:
y = f(k) = Ak:
The technology parameter A grows at constant rate g and capital depreciates at a constant
rate . Competitive rms in this economy maximize their prots by setting the real rate of
return from asset holdings r and the real wage rate w according to the following:
r = Ak 1    (2.9)
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and
w = A(1  )k: (2.10)
2.3.5 Government
In our setting, the governments responsibility is limited to the task of administering the
unemployment insurance and social security programs. The only constraint imposed on the
governments behavior is to enforce self-nancing of both the unemployment and social secu-
rity programs. We restrict our attention to social security arrangements that are described
by the pair (,  s). The self-nancing conditions are as follows:
 s
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 1)wt =
TX
t=t
X
a
tt(a; e)b (2.11)
and
u
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 1)wt =
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 0)wt: (2.12)
2.3.6 An Agents Dynamic Program
We suppose that the temptation function v(:) is strictly increasing, i.e. an agent is tempted
to consume his entire wealth in each period. This implies that the agent maximizes the
second part of equation (2:1) by holding zero asset for the next period, i.e. setting at = 0
in equation (2:7). In this economy, the agents state vector x contains the current asset
holdings and the employment state. Hence, we can write the agents dynamic program for
any arbitrary two period as follows:
W (x) = max
c
fu(c) + v(c) + Es0W (x0)g   v((1 + r)a+ q + ) (2.13)
subject to
a0 + c = (1 + r)a+ q + , a0  0, a0 is given, (2.14)
where Es0 denotes the expectation over survival probabilities.
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If the agent succumbs to a temptation and consumes his entire wealth, the term v(c) 
v((1+r)a+q+) in equation (2:13) cancels out. When he resists to temptation and consumes
less than his wealth, he faces a self-control cost at the amount of v(c)  v((1 + r)a+ q + ).
The agent tries to balance his urge for current consumption v(c) and long-term commitment
utility u(c) + Es0W (x0).
2.3.7 Steady State Equilibrium
In our characterization of the steady state equilibrium, we follow Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)
[24] and Huggett & Ventura (1999) [21].
Given a set prescribing government policy f; ;  s; ug; a steady state recursive compet-
itive equilibrium is a set of value functions fWt(x)gTt=1, households policy rules fat(x)gTt=1,
time invariant measures of agents ft(x)gTt=1, wage and interest rate (w; r), and a lump sum
distribution of accidental bequests  such that all of them satisfy the following:
 Factor prices (w; r) that are derived from the rms rst order conditions satisfy the
equations (2:9) and (2:10).
 Given government policy set f; ;  s; ug, factor prices (w; r); and lump-sum transfer of
accidental bequests , an agents policy rule fat(x)gTt=1 solves the agents maximization
problem (2:13) subject to the budget constraint (2:14).
 Aggregation holds:
K =
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)at 1(x): (2.15)
 The set of age-dependent, time-invariant measures of agents satises in every period t:
t(x
0) =
X
e
X
(e0; e)
a:a0=at(x)
t 1(x); (2.16)
where 1 is given.
 The lump-sum distribution of accidental bequests  satises the equation (2:5).
 Both the social security system and the unemployment insurance benet program are
self-nancing i.e. satisfy the equations (2:11) and (2:12) respectively.
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 The market clears:
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)[at(x) + ct(x)] (2.17)
= Y + (1  )
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)at 1(x):
2.4 CALIBRATION
In this section, we briey dene the parameter values of our model. Each period in our
model corresponds to a year. We closely follow Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)[24] in order to be
able to compare our results to those obtained there.
2.4.1 Demographic and Labor Market Parameters
Agents are born at a real life age of 21 (model age of 1) and they can live up to a maximum
real life age of 85 (model age of 65). The population growth rate n is assumed to be equal to
the average U.S. population growth rate between 1931-2003 which corresponds, on average,
to 1:19% per year.12 The sequence of conditional survival probabilities is the same as the
Social Security Administrations[34] sequence of survival probabilities for men in the year
2001. The mandatory retirement age is equal to 65 (model age 45). In order to set the
e¢ ciency index, we choose the average of Hansens (1993) [20] estimation of median wage
rates for males and females for each age group. We interpolate the data by using the Spline
Method and normalize the interpolated data to average unity. The employment transition
probabilities are chosen to be compatible with the average unemployment rate in the U.S.
which is approximately equal to 0.06 between 1948 and 2003.13 The implied employment
transition matrix assumes the following form:
(e; e0) =
240:94 0:06
0:94 0:06
35
12The population data was obtained from the U. S. Census Bureau.[34]
13The unemployment data are taken from the U. S. Department of Labor.[33]
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2.4.2 Preference Parameters
We choose the values of preference parameters ; ;  and  in such a way that our model-
economys capital-output ratio matches that of the U.S. economy.
In the case where the temptation function v(:) is convex, we choose to follow Imrohoroglu
et al. (2003)[24] and DeJong & Ripoll (2007)[4], in letting  be centered at 2 with a standard
deviation 1, i.e.  = 2 (1). In our benchmark calibration, we initially set  = 2, and then
check for the robustness of our results by letting  = 3. Holding  constant, we choose
di¤erent values of  a priori, and calculate the corresponding  in such a way that u(:)+v(:)
stays a strictly concave function. For every triple ;  and , we search over the values of 
that deliver the capital-output ratio which is compatible with its empirical counterpart. We
assume that the social security replacement ratio is 40% and the unemployment replacement
ratio is 25% during our search.
When the temptation function is concave, we follow DeJong & Ripoll (2007) [4] and set
 = 0:0786(0:056).
2.4.3 Production Parameters
The parameters describing the production-side of the economy are chosen to match the long-
run features of the U.S. economy. Following Imrohoroglu et al. (1998 [24], 2003 [24]), we
set the capital share of output  equal to 0:310 and the annual depreciation rate of physical
capital equal to 0:069. The rate of technological progress g is assumed to be equal to 2:1%;
which is the actual average growth rate of GDP per capita taken over the time interval from
1959 to 1994 (Hugget & Ventura, 1999 [21]). The technology parameter A; can be chosen
freely. In our calibration exercises, it is set equal to 1:01. All per capita quantities are
assumed to grow at a balanced growth rate g.
2.4.4 Government
We set the unemployment insurance replacement ratio () equal to 25% of the employed
wage and allow the social security replacement ratio () to vary between 0 and 1 in order
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to make welfare comparisons with di¤erent replacement ratios. Alternatively, we can choose
the payroll tax rate ( s) and the unemployment insurance tax rate (u) instead of the
replacement ratios. Since the social security and the unemployment insurance benets are
self-nancing, calibrating the replacement ratios will automatically pin-down the tax rates.
This holds true because agents inelastically supply one unit of labor whenever they nd an
opportunity to work, and changes in tax rates do not a¤ect their supply of labor.14
2.5 RESULTS
There is a consensus in the literature about the adverse welfare implications of an unfunded
social security system, which are mainly due to the distortions it impinges on capital accu-
mulation and labor supply. In order to assess these welfare implications we use a compen-
sating variation measure, which is dened as the percentage by which consumption must
be increased to compensate for the decrease in welfare generated by the presence of social
security.
In what follows, we present the results of our calibrations starting with a particular ex-
ample where CRRA preferences (agents are immune from temptation) are used. Thereafter,
we continue our analysis by allowing agents to have self-control preferences.15 ;16
14However, if we calibrate a model featuring labor-leisure choice, tax rates should be used instead of
replacement rates.
15We use discrete-time, discrete-state optimization techniques to nd a steady-state equilibrium of our
hypothetical economy by using the aforementioned parameter values. We follow Imrohoroglu et al. (2003)
[24] in order to be able to engage in a computational method-free evaluation/comparison of our results to
theirs. A discrete set of asset values (containing 4097 points) is created. The lower bound and upper bound
of the set is chosen in a way that the set never binds. We start with a guess about the aggregate capital
stock and the level of accidental bequests and then solve agentsdynamic program by backward recursion.
The time-invariant, age-dependent distribution of agents is obtained by forward recursion. After each loop,
we calculate the new values for the accidental bequests and the capital stock. If the di¤erence between the
initial values and the new values exceeds the tolerance value, we start a new loop with the new values. This
procedure continues until we nd values for the accidental bequests and the capital stock that are su¢ ciently
close to their beginning-of-loop values.
16All tables of this section are presented in the Appendix.
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2.5.1 CRRA Preferences
In our rst calibration we use CRRA preferences and calibrate our economy so as to reach
a capital-output ratio of approximately 2:5 under the assumption of a 40% social security
replacement rate. The steady state features of this economy under alternative social security
replacement rates are displayed in Table 2. Our ndings in this case are congruent with
those in Imrohoroglu et al. (1998, 2003)[24]. Consumption, capital and output reach their
highest levels when the social security replacement rate is zero.
The main intuition is that, despite the fact that social security provides insurance against
life-time uncertainty (due to missing annuities market) and risk sharing among generations,
its negative e¤ect on capital accumulation makes it undesirable.17 Table 2 provides evidence
for that fact. It is worth noting that the level of consumption required to compensate the
consumers (depicted in the last column of the table) increases in a disproportionately manner
compared to a given increase in the social security replacement rate ().
2.5.2 Self-Control Preferences
In this section we assume that agents feature self-control preferences with a convex temp-
tation function. In order to demonstrate the quantitative signicance of the temptation
parameter and its economic meaning, we calculate the quantity of steady state consumption
which would be given up by an agent in order to escape from temptation. To this purpose,
following DeJong & Ripoll (2007)[4], we obtain the value x such that
u(c   x) = u(c) + v(c)  v(c)
where c is the steady state value of the agents actual consumption and c is the steady state
value of temptation consumption. To isolate the e¤ect of , the model is calibrated under
zero social security replacement rate and all other parameters remain xed at their CRRA
case while  is chosen equal to 2. By increasing  from 0 to 0:001, we observe that agents
would be willing to forgo as much as 4:82% of their steady state consumption in order to
17Since there is no labor-leisure decision in our model, social security system has an e¤ect only on capital
accumulation (saving).
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eliminate temptation.18
This is an interesting result that highlights the forceful consequences of an arguably im-
perceptible departure from the CRRA preference specication. It underscores the welfare
reducing role temptation (and the induced cost of self-control) plays in our model. Nonethe-
less, at the same time it validates our main intuition, namely, that social security may not
be as detrimental to welfare as it has been generally argued in the literature.
Next our aim is to investigate whether there is any room for a social security system,
when agents have self-control preferences. In our rst calibration we use the same parameter
values for  in order to measure the impact of temptation on savings, under a 40% social
security replacement rate. This example is a counter-factual in the sense that it does not
yield capital output ratio around 2:5, but it serves as a device to better demonstrate the
e¤ect of self-control preferences on savings.
Tables 3, 4 and Figures 1, 2 show the steady state of an economy with self-control
preferences under 40% replacement ratio. In particular, Table 3 is constructed holding all
parameters of the utility function xed in their CRRA values, except for ; which is the
parameter we vary. The value of parameter  measures the strength of temptation towards
current consumption. Higher values for this parameter corresponds to higher cost of exerting
self-control. We notice that all variables but the interest rate decrease as  increases (i.e. as
we depart from the CRRA case). In particular, the capital-output ratio decreases showing
that the increase of  triggers a process of dissavings. This process deprives the economy
from future consumption capabilities. The latter point is congruent with what we observe
in the consumption pattern as  varies.
Figure 1 illustrates the aforementioned points. We plot lifetime consumption as a function
of age. Even a casual glance suggests that an increase in the temptation intensity () results
in an abrupt departure from the consumption smoothing behavior of a CRRA agent. It
is worth noting how dramatically the early high consumption pattern of a consumer with
higher values of  gets penalized in his retirement years compared to a CRRA consumer. As
it could be expected, for a very low value of  the observed pattern closely resembles that
18DeJong & Ripoll (2007) [4] report the analogous to their environment value as slightly above 5% of the
steady state consumption when the scale of the temptation parameter is increased from 0 to 0:00286:
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of CRRA.
Figure 2 provides additional support to our ndings from the perspective of lifetime
asset holdings. It is worth observing that the discrepancy in savings before retirement
between di¤erent agents (in terms of ) translates to the observed di¤erence in consumption
documented in Figure 1.
Table 4 is constructed holding , and  in their CRRA values and keeping  xed at
0:00009 under 40% social security replacement rate. Now, we only vary  which is a measure
of the consumerswillingness to substitute current temptation consumption for future one.
The higher  is the more the consumer prefers early to late temptation consumption which
actually makes the self-control cost even more severe. This, in turn causes further dissavings
and eventually lower steady state consumption for any value of .
Figure 3 illustrates our ndings in terms of lifetime consumption. The clear di¤erence in
the observed consumption pattern manifests the impact of an increase in .
Additional support is provided by Figure 44. Note that we observe that the impact of
an increase in  on asset holdings is very similar to the impact of an increase in , which
suggests that a given pattern of asset holdings is not uniquely identiable by given (; );
but instead can be induced by di¤erent combinations of those two parameters.
Now that we are able to detect the e¤ect of self-control preferences on savings, we can
calibrate our benchmark economy to analyze the e¤ect of a social security system on the
entire economy.
Table 5 presents the features of various steady states of this economy. Our main point
in this case is that an unfunded social security system serves an additional purpose to that
of the provision of insurance against life-time uncertainty and intergenerational risk-sharing:
It makes the cost of exerting self-control less burdensome by reducing the amount of wealth
through taxing of the current income. One can speculate that if the unfunded social-security
systems negative e¤ect on savings is o¤set by its positive e¤ect on the self-control cost, a
certain level of social security replacement rate may generate larger benets (through an
increase of the level-of-capital channel) than the ones generated in the absence of social
security. This additional benet of the unfunded social security system is absent if an agent
is not endowed with temptation.
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While both social security and self-control, when considered separately, they have detri-
mental e¤ects on welfare, their combination yields a noteworthy result: Welfare reduction
is considerably less severe. The intuition behind this result lies in the following fact: So-
cial security is a mechanism that deprives agents from early consumption. When agents face
temptations, social security accomplishes at the same time to reduce the cost associated with
the exertion of self-control and consequently to partially o¤set its adverse e¤ect on welfare.
Note that this e¤ect is absent in environments where preferences do not allow agents the op-
tion to exert self-control. Not surprisingly, it is also absent in the case where the temptation
component essentially does not modify the consumerslifetime consumption paths. However,
we shouldnt overlook the plausible scenario in which social security makes it more likely that
agents exercise less self-control when they are young, given that retirement consumption is
assured by the government.19 It turns out that our quantitative exercises seem to indicate
that the former intuition is more likely to prevail.
A careful comparison of Table 5 with Table 2 reveals that on the one hand social security
decreases welfare both under the CRRA and the self-control preference specications but
on the other, the presence of self-control preferences seems to mitigate the welfare reducing
e¤ect of social security. This can be seen by directly comparing the compensation needed by
a consumer facing temptation and the one needed by a CRRA consumer in order to o¤set
the adverse welfare e¤ects of social security. Although the scale of the temptation parameter
() is very small, the welfare cost of social security system is almost three times lower than
that of the CRRA preference specication for a given social security replacement ratio (by
comparing the last two columns of the two tables).
Our ndings parallel Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) [24] in that social security indeed entails
welfare losses both under CRRA preferences and non-CRRA preferences and it is less severe
under the latter. They used time-inconsistent preferences as their theoretical apparatus
and concluded that only a negligible percentage of the whole population prefers a social
security system. However, in their framework agents do not face a temptation problem (and
consequently a cost of exerting self-control). Welfare issues stemming from their preference
19We thank an anonymous referee for kindly drawing our attention to this scenario and enhancing our
intuition.
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specication reduce to a commitment problem. Hence in their case, an unfunded social
security system works only as a commitment device. Contrastingly, when consumers face
temptation, social security is considerably less costly than in the case where consumers have
CRRA preferences, precisely thanks to its additional benet of reducing the temptation cost.
This, in turn, mitigates the unfunded social security systems negative welfare e¤ect.
A rather surprising result is displayed in Table 6. The choice of a relatively large value
; results in an increase in welfare as it can be seen in the last column. The meaning of
negative values in the CV column is that there is a welfare cost associated with smaller values
of social security replacement rate. That is, agents should be compensated for the absence
of the social security system. Furthermore, a replacement rate of 60% maximizes welfare.
This rather controversial result is most probably due to the choice of a high  (= 1:011)
which is necessary in order for the targeted empirical capital-output ratio to be achieved.
We believe that this observation further underscores the mitigating e¤ect of the existence of
a temptation component in the utility function as it is identied in our paper. Although this
result is most likely due to the choice of  = 1:011, it is an important as it highlights the
potentially positive impact of social security when agents are highly tempted towards current
consumption.20 ;21 ;22To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that provides an environment
and suitable conditions under which social security may improve welfare.
2.6 CONCLUSION
Expenses related to social security comprise one of the largest expenditure items in the U.S.
governments budget. As a result, there is an extensive literature regarding social security
related issues. The costs and benets of social security are well analyzed by many authors in
20We thank an anonymous referee of the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control for encouraging us
to emphasize the importance of this result.
21Robustness tests of our results have been successfully performed and are available upon request.
22We have also calibrated our model economy to the U.S economy when agents feature a concave temptation
function. In our calibration exercises, we use the value of the parameter  equal to 0:0786 with the standard
deviation equal to 0:056; as estimated by DeJong and Ripoll (2007) [4]. In this case, the life time consumption
path remains essentially invariant to departures from the CRRA case. Accordingly, social security remains
equally detrimental to welfare under self-control preferences as it is under CRRA preferences. Results are
available upon request.
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the context of standard preferences: all of the studies with the exception of Imrohoroglu et
al. (2003) [24] use CRRA preferences. Imrohoroglu et al. use quasi-hyperbolic preferences
instead, and show that even in such a context where social security could be used as a
commitment device, it turns out that social security does not improve welfare.
In the present paper, we assume that consumers have self-control preferences. In our
environment, agents do not have a commitment problem but they instead face a temptation
to consume all of their available wealth at each point in time.
Our methodology consists in implementing calibration techniques, similar to those used
in the related literature, in order to simulate our economy and draw conclusions regarding
the impact of social security on consumerslifetime welfare. In doing so, we consider several
variations of our specication of the temptation utility function (di¤erent degrees of convexity
/ concavity of the temptation function), and assess their inuence separately, while at the
same time compare it with the standard (CRRA) preferences case. Finally, we verify the
numerical validity of our results by administering various robustness tests.
Our main ndings can be summarized in the following: In a world where agents have self-
control preferences social security generally decreases lifetime welfare. Interestingly however,
we call attention to a challenging novelty which is due to our specication of self-control
preferences: The presence of temptation considerably reduces the cost of social security.
That is, indeed social security penalizes welfare but when the economy features agents with
self-control preferences the above cost is substantially mitigated. Moreover, should the cost of
resisting temptation become very high, the introduction of social security may even improve
welfare. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that provides an example of an environment
under which social security may improve welfare.
Furthermore, in our calibrations we measure that the cost of temptation, namely, the
amount of consumption that agents would be willing to relinquish in order to eliminate
temptation is as high as 4:82% of their steady state consumption. Since this percentage
corresponds to an insignicant deviation (increasing  from 0 to 0:001) from the CRRA
preference specication, it underscores the welfare reducing role temptation (and the induced
cost of self-control) plays in our model. Nonetheless, at the same time it validates our main
intuition, namely, that social security may not be as detrimental to welfare as it has been
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generally argued in the literature.
While both social security and self control, when considered separately, have detrimental
e¤ects on welfare, their combination yields a remarkable result: welfare reduction is consid-
erably less severe. The intuition behind this result lies in the following fact: social security is
a mechanism that deprives agents from early consumption. When agents face temptations,
social security at the same time reduces the cost associated with the exertion of self-control
and consequently partially o¤sets its adverse e¤ect on welfare. It is worth noting that this
e¤ect is absent in environments wherein preferences do not allow agents the option to ex-
ert selfcontrol, or in contexts wherein the impact of temptation on lifetime consumption is
moderate.
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Table 1: Parameter Values of The Benchmark Calibration
Demographics
Maximum possible life span T 65
Obligatory retirement age t 45
Growth rate of population n 1:19%
Conditional survival probabilities fstgTt=1 U.S. 2001
Labor e¢ ciency prole fjgt 1t=1 Hansen (1993)
Production
Capital share of GDP  0:310
Annual depreciation of capital stock  0:069
Annual per capita output growth rate g 2:1%
Markov Process for employment transition 
240:94 0:06
0:94 0:06
35
Preferences
Annual discount factor of utility  0:998
Scale factor of the temptation utility  0:000375
Risk aversion parameter  2:0
Risk loving parameter  2:0
Government
Unemployment insurance replacement ratio  0:25
Social security replacement ratio  [0; 1]
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Figure 1: Optimal Consumption Choice-I
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Figure 2: Optimal Asset Holding-I
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Figure 3: Optimal Consumption Choice-II
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Figure 4: Optimal Asset Holding-II
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Table 2: (beta=0.978, gamma=2, lambda=0)
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1.239 3.308 0.971 2.671 0.068 1.088 0.000
0:10 1.225 3.187 0.968 2.602 0.072 1.076 1.300
0:20 1.212 3.081 0.965 2.542 0.075 1.065 2.637
0:30 1.199 2.978 0.962 2.483 0.078 1.054 4.043
0:40 1.188 2.892 0.960 2.434 0.081 1.044 5.460
0:50 1.178 2.814 0.957 2.388 0.084 1.035 6.913
0:60 1.168 2.738 0.954 2.344 0.087 1.026 8.416
0:70 1.159 2.668 0.952 2.301 0.090 1.018 9.951
0:80 1.150 2.605 0.949 2.264 0.093 1.011 11.520
0:90 1.143 2.548 0.947 2.230 0.095 1.004 13.112
1 1.135 2.493 0.944 2.197 0.098 0.997 14.752
Table 3: (beta=0.978, gamma=2, rho=2)
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 0:0004 1:120 2:386 0:939 2:132 0:103 0:984
 = 0:001 1:067 2:046 0:918 1:917 0:122 0:938
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Table 4: (beta=0.978, lambda=0.00009)
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 2 1:168 2:735 0:954 2:342 0:087 1:026
 = 3 1:075 2:091 0:922 1:946 0:119 0:944
Table 5: (beta=0.998, gamma=2, lambda=0.000375, rho=2)
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1:229 3:224 0:969 2:623 0:071 1:080 0:000
0:10 1:216 3:116 0:966 2:562 0:074 1:068 0:294
0:20 1:204 3:015 0:963 2:504 0:077 1:058 0:705
0:30 1:193 2:932 0:961 2:457 0:080 1:048 1:208
0:40 1:184 2:856 0:958 2:412 0:083 1:040 1:795
0:50 1:174 2:783 0:956 2:370 0:086 1:031 2:462
0:60 1:165 2:714 0:953 2:329 0:088 1:023 3:205
0:70 1:157 2:652 0:951 2:292 0:091 1:016 4:008
0:80 1:150 2:600 0:949 2:262 0:093 1:010 4:856
0:90 1:143 2:548 0:947 2:230 0:095 1:004 5:770
1 1:136 2:499 0:944 2:200 0:097 0:998 6:743
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Table 6: (beta=1.0117, gamma=2, lambda=0.00065, rho=2)
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1:255 3:423 0:972 2:727 0:064 1:090 0
0:10 1:242 3:311 0:970 2:665 0:067 1:080  0:867
0:20 1:230 3:210 0:968 2:608 0:070 1:069  1:542
0:30 1:219 3:120 0:966 2:558 0:073 1:060  2:304
0:40 1:209 3:033 0:963 2:508 0:076 1:050  2:385
0:50 1:199 2:959 0:961 2:466 0:078 1:043  2:599
0:60 1:190 2:888 0:959 2:425 0:082 1:034  2:698
0:70 1:182 2:823 0:957 2:387 0:083 1:027  2:696
0:80 1:174 2:764 0:955 2:352 0:085 1:021  2:602
0:90 1:167 2:708 0:953 2:319 0:087 1:014  2:421
1 1:161 2:660 0:951 2:291 0:089 1:008  2:167
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3.0 TEMPTATION PREVALENCE AND UNFUNDED SOCIAL SECURITY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Unfunded social security has long been a topic of controversy, despite its benecial role in
providing intra- and intergenerational risk sharing. This is mainly due to the budget im-
plications that its administration has, but also due to the distortions in labor supply and
savings decisions. In a seminal paper, Diamond (1965)[7] questions the very core of exis-
tence of unfunded social security: in the context of an overlapping generations model where
consumers inelastically supply labor, he shows that the redistribution of income among gen-
erations performed by imposing a social security payroll tax lowers savings and consequently,
the steady state capital stock. Hence, it ends up lowering welfare. Likewise, Auerbach &
Kotliko¤ (1987) [3], (and later Hugget & Ventura (1999) [21]), by using a large-scale overlap-
ping generations model, show that the costs associated with the distortions unfunded social
security entails for the amount of labor supply and capital accumulation exceed its benets
and hence its existence in an economy reduces overall welfare.
Many subsequent studies (e.g. Storesletten et al. (1999) [32]) study di¤erent social
security systems and typically compare welfare across alternative steady states, each corre-
sponding to a stationary equilibriummatching a di¤erent social security system. Imrohoroglu
et al.(1995) [24] emphasize the detrimental e¤ects that unfunded social security has to the
overall welfare in an economy. Interestingly, the possibility that alternative preference spec-
ications, notably those dealing with preference reversals, are likely to bite in some cases
was examined considerably later by Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24], in spite of the existing
evidence from the experimental economics literature that preferences show some degree of
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time inconsistency and agents su¤er from temptation.1
Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24] use time-inconsistent preferences in lieu of CRRA prefer-
ences, alas without identifying any signicant impact of the preference structure on welfare.
However later, Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] use self-control preferences to highlight
that in a context of unfunded social security welfare may be critically a¤ected by the pref-
erence specication, to the extent that in some cases unfunded social security may even
improve welfare.
A follow-up research question pertains to the actual prevalence of this phenomenon in
the general population. While Imrohoroglu et al.(2003)[24] and Kumru & Thanopoulos
(2008)[29] analyze the welfare implications of preference specications that give rise to pref-
erence reversals, they both do so assuming that the entire population features those non-
standard preferences and compare it against a benchmark case where again all agents feature
CRRA preferences.
In this paper I attempt to perform a fully-blown welfare analysis within the context of the
family of models outlined above. I do so by enhancing the parameter space of my model by a
parameter called "temptation prevalence". As it is the case in my main reference papers, in
order to capture the agentstemptation towards current consumption, my model economies
make use of the preference structure pioneered by Phelps & Pollak (1968)[31] and further
elaborated by Gul & Pesendorfer (2004a) [17] to model self-control issues2. Naturally, my
model specication closely follows that of Kumru &Thanopoulos (2008) [29] and Imrohoroglu
et al.(2003) [24]. Likewise, my economic environment features uninsurable individual income
shocks, borrowing constraints and missing annuity markets.
I introduce a "temptation prevalence" parameter by assuming that at the beginning of
their lifetime, each individuals type is predetermined as either CRRA or self-control, mean-
ing they feature either CRRA preferences or self-control preferences respectively throughout
their lifespan. This bears the consequence that at each point in time a generation is born
there will be a measure X of the new population featuring self-control preferences while the
1For a recent overview of studies that provide evidence that individuals indeed exhibit bias toward im-
mediate gratication see Frederick et al (2002) [14].
2In a recent paper Dekel, Lipman, & Rustichini (2008)[6] propose a class of self-control preferences that
nests Gul & Pesendorfer (2001, 2004a, 2004b)[16] preferences but contrary to the latter, takes account of the
multidimensional nature of temptation and uncertainty about temptation.
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remaining (1 X) will necessarily feature CRRA preferences.
My purpose is to investigate the consequences that a continuously varying proportion
of self-control agents entails with regard to the welfare analysis performed in Kumru &
Thanopoulos (2008) [29] and Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24]. In particular, considering the
level of lifetime consumption that obtains in the model with CRRA preferences as my bench-
mark, I examine the extent to which this is penalized as the proportion of self-control agents
in the population progressively increases, for a given intensity of self-control and a given
social security replacement rate. A natural follow-up question on the ndings in Kumru &
Thanopoulos (2008) [29] would be the existence of a su¢ ciently severe temptation problem
that would turn unfunded social security in an economy featuring some non-zero measure of
CRRA agents welfare improving.
I aim to contribute to the debate on unfunded social security and further read into the
ability of alternative preference specications to make headway in resolving the current con-
troversy about the suitability and scope of unfunded social security. Inquiring about the
preference structure is very important for theoretical purposes because it enhances our un-
derstanding of the mechanics of similar models in the literature by providing an additional
channel through which capital accumulation is distorted. As shown in Kumru & Thanopou-
los (2008) [29] and Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24] the presence of slightly far-sighted or current
consumption favored agents changes substantially the welfare implications of the system. In
addition, investigating the impact of the more realistic scenario of mixed population (as
opposed to a population consisting of "only CRRA" or "only self-control" agents) provides
further insights with regard to the existence of settings where unfunded social security im-
proves welfare even under the presence of some CRRA agents.
Therefore, mymixed economy where there exist simultaneously agents with either CRRA
or self-control preferences, allows me to examine the extent to which "temptation prevalence"
across individuals and temptation severity/intensity within individuals are substitutes in o¤-
setting the adverse e¤ects of unfunded social security. In that sense, our model nests previous
relevant models (Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] ) and provides a richer perspective over
the mechanics of the interaction between unfunded social security and self-control prefer-
ences.
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My ndings indicate that indeed, in an economy featuring both CRRA and self-control
individuals, social security can be welfare improving for the latter, provided that the tempta-
tion those agents face is su¢ ciently severe. Moreover, the presence of CRRA agents lowers the
threshold documented in the literature (Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] ) of self-control
intensity required for social security to benet self-control individuals in an "all-self-control"
environment. This is due to the fact that the presence of CRRA agents slows down the
capital decumulation process in the economy and mitigates the welfare cost that temptation
elimination entails for their self-control counterparts. This entails an additional welfare bur-
den to CRRA agents who become worse o¤ not only due to the existence of a forced savings
mechanism such as social security, but also because of the presence of their self-control coun-
terparts in the economy. Note that our results are not sensitive to the unfunded character
of social security; they are essentially driven by the underlying forced savings that such a
mechanism entails.
It is worth noting that one of the most important aspects of this paper consists in the fact
that a more general setting featuring type heterogeneity opens much richer interpretations
pertaining to political economy and hence may naturally accomodate newmodeling features3.
An example includes a government featuring an objective function with preferences over the
welfare of di¤erent types of agents; in turn, these preferences could be an endogenous function
of the voting preferences of the agents types. The trade o¤s arising from such a setting
could provide an additional explanation as to why unfunded social security is so prevalent
throughout the world. Note that such an explanation is not possible in an environment that
abstracts from type heterogeneity, such as that analyzed by Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008)
[29] .
3.2 A MODEL OF SOCIAL SECURITY
The model I consider in this section is a standard one in the social security literature. In
particular, my model follows that of Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] and Imrohoroglu et
al.(2003) [24].
3I thank John Du¤y for pointing out this intuition to me.
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3.2.1 Demographics
I consider a stationary overlapping generations economy in discrete time. Each period a new
generation is born which is modeled to be n percent larger than the previous generation.
Agents face lives of uncertain duration and some live through the maximum possible life
span, denoted by J . At any given time t within their life-span, all agents have a (time-
invariant) conditional probability sj 2 (0; 1) of surviving from age j   1 to j, conditional
on having survived up to age j   1: Our stationary population assumption implies that age
j agents constitute a fraction j of the population at any given date. The cohort shares
fjgJj=1 are given by
j+1 =
jsj+1
1 + n
while their sum is normalized to 1.
At birth, individuals make a draw from a distribution of types. An individuals "type"
can be either CRRA; meaning they have constant relative risk aversion preferences, or SC
meaning they have self-control preferences. At each point in time a generation is born there
will be a time-invariant measure X of the new population featuring self-control preferences
while obviously the remaining (1 X) will feature CRRA preferences. Note that this implies
that we treat X as an exogenously predetermined parameter in our model. I will henceforth
call X the "temptation prevalence" in the economy.
3.2.2 Preferences
As noted in the previous paragraph, a proportionX of the agents in our economy feature self-
control preferences and its complement feature CRRA preferences. self-control preferences
prescribe that in every period the agent faces a temptation to consume their entire wealth.
Resisting temptation gives rise to a self-control cost; note that the latter feature is absent
in models with CRRA and quasi-hyperbolic preferences. I proceed to model self-control
preferences recursively.
LetW (x) denote the maximized value of the expected discounted objective function with
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state x. The utility function of an agent i is as follows:
Wi(x) = max
c
fu(c) + 1fi2SXgv(c) + EW (x0)g   1fi2SXgmaxc v(c) (3.1)
where E is the expectation operator; u(:) and v(:) are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions, 1fg is the indicator function while SX denotes the set of self-control agents in the
economy; 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor; c represents the "commitment" consumption; c is
the "temptation" consumption; and x0 denotes next period state variable. As in the section
above, u(:) represents the momentary utility function and v(:) represents temptation. In
particular, v(c)  max
c
v(c) denotes the disutility from choosing consumption c instead of c.
The concavity or convexity of v(:) turns out to be very important for our analysis.4
The momentary utility, convex temptation and concave temptation functions are assumed
to take the following forms respectively:
u(c) =
c1    1
1   (3.2)
v(c) = 
c

(3.3)
v(c) = u(c) (3.4)
In the specication above, higher values of the scale parameter  > 0, imply an increase
in the share of "temptation" utility, i.e. a higher  increases the importance of current
consumption for an agent. The momentary utility function u(:) is a standard Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form,  > 0 measures the degree of relative risk aversion
(and 1= the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution).
4Notice that if v(:) is convex, we need to make sure that v(:)+u(:) is stricly concave. In particular,  > 0,
 > 1 and 0 <  < =(c+1c 2) guarantee that u(:) is concave, v(:) is convex and u(:) + v(:) is strictly
concave. When v(:) is concave, one should show that W (:) is strictly concave.
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3.2.3 Production Function
Firms have access to a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that produces
output (Yt) by using labor input (Lt = 0:94
j 1P
j=1
jj ) and capital input (Kt) which is rented
from households:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) = AtK

t L
(1 )
t (3.5)
where At represents the state of technology;  2 (0; 1) is the capitals share of output, j
denotes the compulsory retirement age and j denotes the e¢ ciency index of an age j agent.
Dening the capital-labor ratio as Kt
Lt
, we can write the production function in intensive form
as follows:
yt = f(kt) = Atk

t
The technology parameter At grows at a constant rate g and capital depreciates at a constant
rate .
Competitive rms in this economy maximize their prots by setting the real rate of
return from asset holdings r and the real wage rate w according to the following:
rt = Atk
 1
t    (3.6)
wt = At(1  )kt (3.7)
Since I am concerned only with steady state equlibrium , I henceforth drop the time
subscript for the rest of the analysis.
3.2.4 Budget Constraints
The exogenously given mandatory retirement age is t. Agents who are younger than age t
face a stochastic employment opportunity. Agents that nd a chance to work, inelastically
supply one unit of labor.5 I denote the employment state by e 2 f0; 1g where 0 and 1
5Adding labor-leisure choice into the model requires the modication of preferences in a way that agents
are not only tempted by current consumption but also by current leisure.
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denote unemployment and employment states respectively. The employment state follows
a rst order Markov process. Transition probabilities between current employment state e
and next period employment state e0 are denoted by the 2 2 matrix (e0; e) = [k0k] where
k0; k = 0; 1 and k0k = Prfe0 = k0je = kg.
An employed agent earns wt where w denotes the wage rate in terms of the consumption
good and t denotes the e¢ ciency index of an age t agent. If an agent is at the unemployment
state, he receives unemployment insurance benet equal to the fraction of employed wage
(wt) where  is the unemployment insurance replacement ratio.
Agents retire at age t and receive a lump-sum social security benet b. The social
security benet b is dened as a fraction  of an average life time employed income, which
is independent of an agents employment history6:
b =
8<: 0 for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1;Pt 1t=1 wt
t 1 for t = t
; t + 1; :::; T .
The above benet formula is predominantly used in this paper since it is a standard on
all other papers with which we compare our work. For the sake of completeness, I also use
the following more realistic approximation of the actual social security benets formula and
compare our results with the case of linear benets:
b =
8><>:
0 for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1;
ln
Pt 1
t=1 wt
t 1

for t = t; t + 1; :::; T .
It is worth noting that the actual monthly social security benet provided by the Social
Security Administration is calculated according to a (continuous) piecewise linear concave
function of the average indexed monthly earnings of an individual. The vector of slopes
associated with this is [0:9; 0:32; 0:15]. My logarithmic specication is an excellent approxi-
mation of the above concave piecewise linear function, as it captures the essence of unfunded
social security, while at the same time provides signicant savings in terms of computational
burden by capturing most of the information contained in those three parameters.
The disposable income of an agent at age t can be written as:
6Note that this formula entails unbounded benets.
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qt =
8>>><>>>:
(1   s   u)wt for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1; if e = 1;
wt for t = 1; 2; :::; t   1; if e = 0;
b for t = t; t + 1; :::; T .
In the specication above  s and u represent the social security tax rate and the unemploy-
ment insurance tax rate respectively.
I assume away private insurance markets against the unemployment risk and private
annuities markets against uncertain life-span. Note that, although an annuities market
exists in the U.S., it is very thin (Imrohoroglu, 1995 [22]). Hence, my assumption seems
innocuous. In my model, social security partially fullls the role of the missing annuities
market (it can be considered as mandatory annuitization) 7.
Consequently, in our model the only available device to smooth consumption across
ones lifetime is the accumulation of assets in terms of physical capital. Agents cannot hold
negative assets at any period. In other words, an agent faces a borrowing (or liquidity)
constraint. There are two main reasons justifying this assumption: First, our desire for a
careful numerical comparison of our results with those in the existing literature in which
this assumption is a standard one. Second, constraining agents from borrowing against their
future income induces an additional boost in (private) savings for precautionary purposes,
as long as agents may be/remain unemployed with a positive probability. If we relaxed
this constraint, the ability to borrow would lower agentsmarginal propensity to save (for
precautionary reasons). This would, in turn, render the e¤ects of self-control and ability to
borrow against future income highly correlated and hard to tell apart. As a result, the e¤ect
of social security on savings due to self-control would not be identiable8.
Since death is certain at T and there is no bequest motive, the borrowing constraint can
be stated as: 8<: at  0 for t = 1; :::T   1;at = 0 for t = T:
Note the absence of a bequest motive in our economy. Allowing a bequest motive also
7Diamond et al. (2005)[11] analyze thoroughly the relationship between annuities and individual welfare.
They show that full annuitization of wealth is optimal under certain conditions.
8In a recent paper, Rojas & Urrutia (2007) [32] show that adding an endogenous borrowing constraint
reduces the welfare cost of social security.
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changes the welfare implications of social security.9
If agents in this economy die before age T , their remaining assets will be distributed to
all of the survivors in a lump-sum fashion. Let  denote the equal amount of accidental
bequests distributed to all remaining members of the society:
 =
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(a; e)(1  st+1)at(a; e); (3.8)
where (a; e) is the set of age dependent, time independent measures of agents.
Hence, we can write the budget constraint of an agent as follows:
at + ct = (1 + r)at 1 + qt +  (3.9)
and
at + ct = (1 + r)at 1 + qt + ; (3.10)
where r is the rate of return from the asset holdings.
3.2.5 Government
In our setting, the governments responsibility is limited to the task of administering the
unemployment insurance and social security programs. The only constraint imposed on the
governments behavior is to enforce self-nancing of both the unemployment and social secu-
rity programs. We restrict our attention to social security arrangements that are described
by the pair (,  s). The self-nancing conditions are as follows:
 s
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 1)wt =
TX
t=t
X
a
tt(a; e)b (3.11)
and
u
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 1)wt =
t 1X
t=1
X
a
tt(a; e = 0)wt: (3.12)
9Fuster et al. (2002)[15] perform a welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework and show
that steady-state welfare increases with social security.
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3.2.6 An Agents Dynamic Program
We suppose that the temptation function v(:) is strictly increasing, i.e. a self-control agent is
tempted to consume his entire wealth in each period. This implies that a self-control agent
maximizes the second part of equation (3:1) by holding zero asset for the next period, i.e.
setting at = 0 in equation (3:10). In this economy, the agents state vector x contains the
current asset holdings and the employment state. Hence, agent is Bellmans equation for
any arbitrary two-periods span can be written as follows:
Wi(x) = max
c
fu(c) + 1fi2SXgv(c) + Es0W (x0)g   1fi2SXgv((1 + r)a+ q + ) (3.13)
subject to
a0 + c = (1 + r)a+ q + , a0  0, a0 is given, (3.14)
where Es0 denotes the expectation over survival probabilities.
In the case of a self-contol agent who succumbs to temptation and consumes his entire
wealth, the term
1fi2SXgv(c)  1fi2SXgv((1 + r)a+ q + )
in equation (3:13) cancels out. When, however, he resists to temptation and consumes less
than his wealth, he incurs a self-control cost at the amount of v(c)   v((1 + r)a + q + ).
A self-control agent tries to balance his urge for current consumption v(c) and long-term
commitment utility u(c) + Es0W (x0).
3.2.7 Steady State Equilibrium
Given a set prescribing government policy f; ;  s; ug; a steady state recursive competitive
equilibrium is a set of value functions fWt(x)gTt=1, households policy rules fat(x)gTt=1, time
invariant measures of agents ft(x)gTt=1, wage and interest rate (w; r), and a lump sum
distribution of accidental bequests  such that all of them satisfy the following:
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 Factor prices (w; r) that are derived from the rms rst order conditions satisfy the
equations (3:6) and (3:7).
 Given government policy set f; ;  s; ug, factor prices (w; r); and lump-sum transfer of
accidental bequests , an agents policy rule fat(x)gTt=1 solves the agents maximization
problem (3:13) subject to the budget constraint (3:14).
 Aggregation holds:
K =
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)at 1(x): (3.15)
 The set of age-dependent, time-invariant measures of agents satises in every period t:
t(x
0) =
X
e
X
(e0; e)
a:a0=at(x)
t 1(x); (3.16)
where 1 is given.
 The lump-sum distribution of accidental bequests  satises the equation (3:8).
 Both the social security system and the unemployment insurance benet program are
self-nancing i.e. satisfy the equations (3:11) and (3:12) respectively.
 The market clears:
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)[at(x) + ct(x)] (3.17)
= Y + (1  )
X
t
X
a
X
e
tt(x)at 1(x):
3.3 CALIBRATION
In this section, we briey dene the parameter values of our model. Each period in our
model corresponds to a calendar year.
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3.3.1 Demographic and Labor Market Parameters
Agents are born at a real life age of 21 (model age of 1) and they can live up to a maximum
real life age of 85 (model age of 65). The population growth rate n is assumed to be equal to
the average U.S. population growth rate between 1931-2003 which corresponds, on average,
to 1:19% per year.10 The sequence of conditional survival probabilities is the same as the
Social Security Administrations sequence of survival probabilities for men in the year 2001.
The mandatory retirement age is equal to 65 (model age 45).
In order to set the e¢ ciency index, we choose the average of Hansens (1993)[20] esti-
mation of median wage rates for males and females for each age group. We interpolate the
data by using the Spline Method and normalize the interpolated data to average unity. The
employment transition probabilities are chosen to be compatible with the average unemploy-
ment rate in the U.S. which is approximately equal to 0:06 between 1948 and 2003:11 The
implied employment transition matrix assumes the following form:
(e; e0) =
240:94 0:06
0:94 0:06
35 :
3.3.2 Preference Parameters
We choose the values of preference parameters ; ;  and  in such a way that our model
economys capital-output ratio matches that of the U.S. economy.
In the case where the temptation function v(:) is convex, we choose to follow Imrohoroglu
et al.(2003)[24] and DeJong & Ripoll (2007)[4], in letting  be centered at 2 with a standard
deviation 1, i.e.,  = 2(1). In our benchmark calibration, we initially set  = 2, and then
check the robustness of our results by letting  = 3. Holding  constant, we choose di¤erent
values of  a priori, and calculate the corresponding  in such a way that u(:) + v(:) stays
a strictly concave function. For every triple ;  and , we search over the values of 
that deliver the capital-output ratio which is compatible with its empirical counterpart. We
10The population data was obtained from the U. S. Census Bureau .[37]
11The unemployment data are taken from the U. S. Department of Labor.[36]
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assume that the social security replacement ratio is 40% and the unemployment replacement
ratio is 25% during our search.
When the temptation function is concave, we follow DeJong & Ripoll (2007)[4] and set
 = 0:0786(0:056)
3.3.3 Production Parameters
The parameters describing the production side of the economy are chosen to match the long-
run features of the U.S. economy. Following Imrohoroglu et al.(2003)[24], we set the capital
share of output  equal to 0:310 and the annual depreciation rate of physical capital equal
to 0:069. The rate of technological progress g is assumed to be equal to 2:1%; which is the
actual average growth rate of GDP per capita taken over the time interval from 1959 to 1994
(Hugget & Ventura (1999)[21]). The technology parameter A; can be chosen freely. In our
calibration exercises, it is set equal to 1:01. All per capita quantities are assumed to grow
at a constant rate g.
3.3.4 Government
We set the unemployment insurance replacement ratio () equal to 25% of the employed
wage. In the benchmark case, we set the social security replacement ratio () equal to 40%.
Alternatively, we can choose the payroll tax rate ( s) and the unemployment insurance tax
rate (u) instead of the replacement ratios. Since the social security and the unemployment
insurance benets are self-nancing, calibrating the replacement ratios will automatically
pin-down the tax rates. This holds true because agents inelastically supply one unit of labor
whenever they nd an opportunity to work, and changes in tax rates do not a¤ect their
supply of labor.12
12However, if I calibrate a model featuring labor-leisure choice, tax rates should be used instead of replace-
ment rates.
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3.3.5 Solution Method
We use discrete-time, discrete-state optimization techniques to nd a steady state equilibrium
of our model economy by using the aforementioned parameter values. Our solution method
designedly resembles those of previous studies.13
To this purpose we create a discrete set of asset values that contains 4097 points. The
lower bound and upper bound of the set is chosen in such a way that the set boundaries never
bind14. While the state space for working age agents comprises 4097  2 points, the state
space for retired agents consists of only 4097  1 points (since there is no state transition
after j).The discrete set of the control variable (consumption) contains 4097 1 points.
Our solution algorithm prescribes that we start with a guess about the aggregate capital
stock and the level of accidental bequests and then proceed to solve agentsdynamic program
by backward recursion. The time-invariant, age-dependent distribution of agents is obtained
by forward recursion. After each loop, we calculate the new values for the accidental bequests
and the capital stock. If the di¤erence between the initial values and the new values exceeds
the tolerance value, we start a new loop with the new values.
This procedure continues until we nd values for the accidental bequests and the capital
stock that are su¢ ciently close to their beginning-of-loop values.
3.4 RESULTS
In order to assess these welfare implications of unfunded social security we use a "compen-
sating variation" measure, which is dened as the percentage by which consumption must
be increased to compensate for the decrease in welfare generated by the presence of social
security. Although this welfare decrease may be due to the distortions that unfunded social
security inicts on capital accumulation and labor supply, in what follows we will outline
the conditions under, as well as the extent to, which the presence of self-control preferences
13See Auerbach & Kotliko¤ (1987)[3] Imrohoroglu et al. (1995[22] and 2003[24]) and Hugget & Ventura
(1999)[21].
14In particular, the lower bound is equal to 0 and the upper bound is equal to 60 times greater than the
annual income of an employed agent.
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o¤sets the above e¤ects.
We consider our work as complementary to Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008)[29] who,
however, examine exclusively the consequences of the severity of the self-control problem in
an economy populated exclusively by self-control agents.
In contrast, we allow for mixed economies where agents can have either CRRA or self-
control preferences, and this allows us to examine the extent to which "temptation preva-
lence" across individuals and temptation severity/intensity within individuals are substitutes
in o¤setting the adverse e¤ects of unfunded social security.
Therefore, in that sense our model nests Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008)[29] as a special
case corresponding to the case of "All-Self-Control" preferences presented below. In this
section we report the results obtained by using the linear benet function15 instead of the
logarithmic one. This is due to our wish to perform exact numerical comparison with our
main reference paper, but also due to the fact that the results obtained by considering a
concave benet function are not qualitatively di¤erent, while the discrepancy in their respec-
tive numerical values is negligible. We provide an intuitive explanation for this observation
here16:
In our model an individual works 94% of their lifetime. The working period is 45 years.
Hence, an individual works on average 42 years. Since individual wage earnings do not
change signicantly year to year, averaging over the 35 highest years (as the Social Security
Administration mandates with regards to the calculation of the average indexed monthly
earnings) almost amounts to averaging over 45 years. However, if the duration of unem-
ployment were su¢ ciently long, e.g., if an individual remained unemployed for 15 years and
worked for 30 years, then averages in this case would matter. We dont allow for similarly
long spans of unemployment in our model. In fact, in the absence of earning shocks in our
model (which would give rise to much higher earnings heterogeneity), the degree of concavity
of the benets function becomes immaterial, even locally.
In the following subsections, we rst examine the two extreme cases in our model, namely,
the case where all agents feature CRRA preferences (of a given parametrization), followed
15As in the section outlining the budget constraints of this model.
16All numerical values from the use of the logarithmic benet function are available upon request.
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by the case where all agents have self-control preferences of a given parametrization featur-
ing modest intensity of self-control. Naturally, we examine mixed economies in the third
subsection.
3.4.1 The case of all-CRRA Preferences (X = 0)
Our rst calibration makes use of CRRA preferences and our economy is calibrated in such
a way as to reach a capital-output ratio of approximately 2:5 under the assumption of a 40%
social security replacement rate. The steady state features of this economy under alternative
social security replacement rates are displayed in Table 8. Our ndings in this case are
congruent with those in Imrohoroglu et al. (1998, 2003) and in Kumru & Thanopoulos
(2008) [29] . Consumption, capital and output reach their highest levels when the social
security replacement rate is zero, that is, under complete absence of unfunded social security.
The main intuition is that, despite the fact that social security provides insurance against
life-time uncertainty (due to missing annuities market) and risk sharing among generations,
its negative e¤ect on capital accumulation prevails over these benets and hence, makes it
undesirable.17 Table 8 provides evidence for that fact.
It is worth noting that the level of consumption required to compensate the consumers
(depicted in the last column of the table) increases in a disproportionate manner compared
to a given increase in the social security replacement rate ().
3.4.2 The case of all-self-control Preferences (X = 1)
This section draws heavily from Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] . We assume that agents
feature self-control preferences with a convex temptation function. In order to demonstrate
the quantitative signicance of the temptation parameter and its economic meaning, we
calculate the quantity of steady state consumption which would be given up by an agent in
order to escape from temptation. As in DeJong & Ripoll (2007) [4], we obtain the value x
such that
17Since there is no labor-leisure decision in our model, social security has an e¤ect only on capital accu-
mulation (saving).
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u(c   x) = u(c) + v(c)  v(c)
where c is the steady state value of the agents actual consumption and c is the steady state
value of temptation consumption. To isolate the e¤ect of , the model is calibrated under
zero social security replacement rate and all other parameters remain xed at their CRRA
case while  is chosen equal to 2. By increasing  from 0 to 0:001, we observe that agents
would be willing to forgo as much as 4:82% of their steady state consumption in order to
eliminate temptation18.
Note the signicant impact that a slight departure from the CRRA preference specica-
tion entails for welfare. It underscores the welfare reducing role temptation (and the induced
cost of self-control) plays in my model. Nonetheless, at the same time it validates the in-
tuition also developed in Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] , namely, that in the presence
of self-control problems, unfunded social security may not be as detrimental to welfare as it
had generally been argued in the literature. In order to see this, in my rst calibration I use
the same parameter values for  in order to measure the impact of temptation on savings,
under a 40% social security replacement rate. This example is a counter-factual in the sense
that it does not yield capital output ratio around 2:5, but it serves as a device to better
demonstrate the e¤ect of self-control preferences on savings.
Tables 9, 1019 show the steady state of an economy with self-control preferences under
40% replacement ratio. In particular, Table 9 is constructed holding all parameters of the
utility function xed in their CRRA values, except for ; which is the parameter I vary.
The value of parameter  measures the strength of temptation towards current consumption.
Higher values for this parameter correspond to higher cost of exerting self-control. We notice
that all variables but the interest rate decrease as  increases (i.e. as we depart from the
CRRA case). In particular, the capital-output ratio decreases showing that the increase of 
18DeJong and Ripoll (2007) [4] report the analogous to their environment value as slightly above 5% of
the steady state consumption when the scale of the temptation parameter is increased from 0 to 0:00286:
19Table 10 is constructed holding , and  in their CRRA values and keeping  xed at 0:00009 under
40% social security replacement rate. Now, we only vary  which is a measure of the consumerswillingness
to substitute current temptation consumption for future one. The higher  is the more the consumer prefers
early to late temptation consumption which actually makes the self-control cost even more severe. This, in
turn causes further dissavings and eventually lower steady state consumption for any value of .
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triggers a process of dissavings. This process deprives the economy from future consumption
capabilities. The latter point is congruent with what we observe in the consumption pattern
as  varies.
3.4.3 The case of Mixed Preferences (0 < X < 1)
For the sake of comparison with our previous ndings I will follow Kumru & Thanopoulos
(2008) [29] and consider only self-control preferences with a convex temptation function. In
terms of the model, this is summarized by setting the value of the parameter  equal to 2.
With regards to the gradual introduction of self-control agents in the economy, my protocol
consists in setting the initial value of X equal to 0:95 and progressively decreasing it (i.e.
increasing the measure of CRRA agents in the economy) by increments of 0:05.
In what follows in this subsection, consumption refers to the steady state consumption
of self-control agents in the economy unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Initially, for each intermediate value of X, I calculate the quantity of steady state con-
sumption that a self-control agent would be willing to give up in order to escape from
temptation20. As it was the case in the "all-self-control" economy of the preceding section,
I isolate the e¤ect of  by calibrating the model under zero social security replacement rate
( = 0),  = 2, while keeping all other parameter values xed at their CRRA case values.
The results are shown in Table 1121.
The last row of Table 11 displays the fraction of steady state consumption that a self-
control agent is willing to relinquish in order to eliminate temptation. So, while in the case
whereX = 1 and  increases from 0 to 0:001 the percentage of steady state consumption that
self-control agents would be willing to give up is equal to 4:82% , the analogous percentage
of a self-control agent in an economy populated only at a 50% (X = 0:5) by self-control
agents is only equal to 2:31% and, not surprisingly, when the two thirds of the population
have self-control preferences, we can see that the cost of temptation is as high as 4:17% of
their steady state consumption.
20This is a similar to the case of X = 1 exercise with the di¤erence that we now consider several interme-
diate values of X 2 [0; 1].
21In Table 11, all consumption numbers refer to self control agents with  = 0:001.
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This is due to the presence of CRRA agents in the economy who considerably halt the rate
of capital decumulation in the economy and hence render the cost of temptation elimination
more a¤ordable to their self-control counterparts. An increase in the percentage of self-
control individuals in the economy triggers a process of dissavings, in the same manner
as, for a given X, an increase in  does. This process deprives the economy from future
consumption opportunities, something that becomes apparent in the consumption pattern
depicted in all of the folowing Tables .
Next, we focus on the e¤ects of a positive  on consumption and welfare. For each
intermediate value of X we repeat the analysis we did in the previous section regarding the
case where X = 1. In particular, we initially set  = 0:00009,  = 2 under a 40% social
security replacement rate and hold , and  in their CRRA values. We start decreasing X
by steps of 0:05 and report a summary of our results in Table 12.
We observe that the steady state consumption of self-control agents in the economy
drops as the measure of self-control agents increases. However, for a given , this happens
to a lesser degree, compared to the case where the economy is populated exclusively by
self-control individuals.
Our next task is to perform the same experiment, for a higher level of , equal to 0:0004
(Table 13), and  = 0:001 (Table 14).
Again, similar to Table 12 results obtain here as well: for a given ; the drop in con-
sumption is not as abrupt as it is the case in an "all-self-control" economy. Another angle to
see this, is the amount of steady state capital in the economy22, which turns out to be higher
for a mixed economy, eventually allowing for more production/consumption opportunities.
Hence, for a given intensity of self-control, the introduction of self-control agents in the
economy has both costs and benets. The costs are associated with the acceleration of the
process of dissavings in the economy while the benets stem from the fact that an increasing
number of agents are not adversely a¤ected by unfunded social security to the extent that
CRRA agents are.
A more careful look at the above tables allows us to obtain an estimate about the
combined e¤ects of  and X. In particular, I can now consider X as given and see what
22Shown in the second row of Tables 12-13-14.
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is the e¤ect of an increase in the value of  from 0:0009 (Table 12, entry (1; 3) ) to 0:001
(Table 14, entry (1; 3) ) on steady state consumption when e.g. X = 0:5, and compare
it with the variation in steady state consumption due to the same numerical increase in 
shown in Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] (Tables 12 and 14, entries (1; 5)). In Kumru &
Thanopoulos (2008) [29] , consumption drops by 3:69%, while in our X = 0:5 scenario, it
only drops by 2:82%23.
So, the presence of CRRA agents reduces the cost in terms of lost steady state con-
sumption for their self-control counterparts. Moreover, the aforementioned results conrm
our intuition that the smaller the number of self-control agents, the more they benet from
CRRA agentsconsumption smoothing and capital accumulation behavior.
To see this, in the Table 15 that follows I report consumption values for CRRA agents
using parameters corresponding to those used in Table 14. Recall that in order to isolate
the e¤ect of injecting self-control agents of a given self-control intensity ( = 0:001) in the
economy, the model is calibrated under the assumption that  = 0:4,  = 2, and all other
parameter values remain xed at their CRRA values.
Table 15 shows that the consumption levels of CRRA agents are penalized even more
than the corresponding levels of self-control agents shown in Table 14. This is not a surprising
result: we already know (by Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] and Imrohoroglu et al.(2003)
[24]) that CRRA agents were expected to be worse o¤under any scenario involving unfunded
social security relative to a scenario featuring the absence of social security. What is new
here is that CRRA agents seem to "subsidize" self-control agentswelfare. To see that, rst
note that more capital in the economy gives rise to higher wages for all agents. However,
this also implies a lower return on capital, so the net e¤ect is ambiguous. But recall also
that we have imposed an accidental bequest condition which means that at any point in
time, a CRRA agent who dies will leave a higher "accidental bequest" than a self-control
agent. Hence the total amount of capital that returns to the economy through this channel
comes predominantly from CRRA agents, but is redistributed equally to all surviving agents
regardless of type. Thus, the ambiguity is eliminated.
In summary, my results indicate that the process of "injecting" self-control agents in the
23For X = 0:1 the drop is equal to 0:96% , and for X = 0:95 the drop is equal to 3:28%
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economy has, to some extent, commensurable consequences as the process of increasing the
severity of temptation in an economy populated only by self-control agents, as in Kumru &
Thanopoulos (2008) [29] . When agents face temptations, social security accomplishes at the
same time to reduce the cost associated with the exertion of self-control and consequently to
partially o¤set its adverse e¤ect on welfare. On the other hand, the simultaneous existence
of a CRRA subset in the population slows down the proccess of capital decumulation and
mitigates welfare reduction for self-control agents.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
There is an open question in the public nance literature with regards to the conditions
under which unfunded social security can be benecial for some individuals in the economy,
if at all. Early research, both theoretical and empirical, mostly with agents featuring CRRA
preferences, argued that PAYGO social security can only be detrimental for welfare, a result
that comes in stark contrast with the actual prevalence of unfunded social security systems
across the world.
Recent attempts to reconcile empirical observation with economic theory, showed that
alternative preference specications may substantially mitigate the welfare reducing potential
of unfunded social security even when it comes through the exact same channels identied
in the literature that advocates the elimination of social security. Notably, when individuals
feature self-control preferences it was shown that PAYGO social security may even be welfare
improving under certain conditions.
In this paper I built on the theory advocating the conditional usefulness of unfunded
social security in an environment where all, or some individuals in my model economy face
the temptation to consume their entire wealth.
My contribution to the literature consists in addressing and quantitatively assessing the
prevalence of self-control preferences across the population in the economy and not only
in examining the impact of the severity of temptation within individuals (intensity of self-
control). I allow therefore, for mixed economies where agents can have either CRRA or
self-control preferences, and this allows me to examine the extent to which "temptation
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prevalence" across individuals and temptation severity/intensity within individuals are sub-
stitutes in o¤setting the adverse e¤ects of unfunded social security. In that sense, my model
nests previous relevant models (Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] ) and provides a richer
perspective over the mechanics of the interaction between unfunded social security and self-
control preferences.
I quantify the cost of temptation in an environment where both CRRA and self-control
agents co-exist when for several values of the temptation prevalence parameter, X. Not
surprisingly, this cost of temptation, namely, the amount of consumption that self-control
agents would be willing to relinquish in order to eliminate temptation ranges from 0:46% of
their steady state consumption when the CRRA agents constitute 90% of the population,
to 4:17% when they are only at 5%. Naturally, those percentages are lower than the cor-
responding level under the assumption of an economy populated exclusively by self-control
agents (X = 1) which is 4:82%.
I nd that indeed, in an economy featuring both CRRA and self-control individuals, social
security can be welfare improving for the latter, provided that those agents face su¢ ciently
severe temptation. Moreover, the presence of CRRA agents lowers the threshold of self-
control intensity required for social security to benet self-control individuals in an "all-
self-control" environment. This is due to the fact that the presence of CRRA agents slows
down the capital decumulation process in the economy and mitigates the welfare cost that
temptation elimination entails for their self-control counterparts. Finally, I also nd that
this entails an additional welfare burden to CRRA agents who become worse o¤ not only
due to the existence of a forced savings mechanism such as social security but also because
of the presence of their self-control counterparts in the economy. Note that my results are
not sensitive to the unfunded character of social security; they are essentially driven by the
underlying forced savings such a mechanism entails.
As noted, one of the most important aspects of my generalization consists in the fact that
a setting featuring type heterogeneity is open to more general interpretations pertaining to
political economy and hence may naturally accomodate new modeling features. An example
includes a government featuring an objective function with preferences over the welfare
of di¤erent types of agents; in turn, these preferences could be an endogenous function
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of the voting preferences of the agents types. The trade o¤s arising from such a setting
could provide an additional explanation as to why unfunded social security is so prevalent
throughout the world. Note that such an explanation is not possible in an environment that
abstracts from type heterogeneity, such as that analyzed by Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008)
[29] .
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Table 7: Parameter Values of The Benchmark Calibration
Demographics
Maximum possible life span T 65
Obligatory retirement age t 45
Growth rate of population n 1:19%
Conditional survival probabilities fstgTt=1 U.S. 2001
Labor e¢ ciency prole fjgt 1t=1 Hansen (1993)
Production
Capital share of GDP  0:310
Annual depreciation of capital stock  0:069
Annual per capita output growth rate g 2:1%
Markov Process for employment transition 
240:94 0:06
0:94 0:06
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Preferences
Annual discount factor of utility  0:998
Scale factor of the temptation utility  0:000375
Risk aversion parameter  2:0
Risk loving parameter  2:0
Government
Unemployment insurance replacement ratio  0:25
Social security replacement ratio  [0; 1]
Compulsory deposit rate  0:027
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Table 8: (beta=0.978, gamma=2, lambda=0)
 Y K C K=Y r w CV (%)
0 1.239 3.308 0.971 2.671 0.068 1.088 0.000
0:10 1.225 3.187 0.968 2.602 0.072 1.076 1.300
0:20 1.212 3.081 0.965 2.542 0.075 1.065 2.637
0:30 1.199 2.978 0.962 2.483 0.078 1.054 4.043
0:40 1.188 2.892 0.960 2.434 0.081 1.044 5.460
0:50 1.178 2.814 0.957 2.388 0.084 1.035 6.913
0:60 1.168 2.738 0.954 2.344 0.087 1.026 8.416
0:70 1.159 2.668 0.952 2.301 0.090 1.018 9.951
0:80 1.150 2.605 0.949 2.264 0.093 1.011 11.520
0:90 1.143 2.548 0.947 2.230 0.095 1.004 13.112
1 1.135 2.493 0.944 2.197 0.098 0.997 14.752
Table 9: (beta=0.978, gamma=2, rho=2)
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 0:0004 1:120 2:386 0:939 2:132 0:103 0:984
 = 0:001 1:067 2:046 0:918 1:917 0:122 0:938
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Table 10: (beta=0.978, lambda=0.00009)
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 2 1:168 2:735 0:954 2:342 0:087 1:026
 = 3 1:075 2:091 0:922 1:946 0:119 0:944
Table 11: (beta=0.978, theta=0, rho=2, lambda: 0 to 0.001)
X : CRRA 0:1 0:3 0:5 0:7 0:95 SC
C N=A 0:9552 0:9506 0:9459 0:9332 0:9249 0:9201
% 0 0:461 1:175 2:309 4:173 4:744 4:821
Table 12: (beta=0.978, lambda=0.00009)
X : CRRA 0:1 0:5 0:95 SC
C N=A 0:9622 0:9588 0:9543 0:9541
K 2:892 2:878 2:813 2:748 2:735
Table 13: (beta=0.978, lambda=0.0004)
X : CRRA 0:1 0:5 0:95 SC
C N=A 0:9591 0:9437 0:9402 0:9391
K 2:892 2:805 2:609 2:487 2:391
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Table 14: (beta=0.978, lambda=0.001)
X : CRRA 0:1 0:5 0:95 SC
C N=A 0:9529 0:9317 0:923 0:9189
K 2:892 2:701 2:423 2:246 2:046
Table 15: (beta=0.978, theta=0.4, rho=2, lambda: 0 to 0.001)
X : CRRA 0:1 0:3 0:5 0:7 0:95 SC
C 0:9642 0:9432 0:9345 0:9198 0:9089 0:8817 N=A
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4.0 SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM AND TEMPTATION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
1There is an abundance of studies related to the importance of social security and its impact
on welfare. The primary reason for this is its dramatically growing scale which triggers
renewed academic debate regarding the optimal allocation of the available resources. This
controversy stems from the huge monetary burden that the mere presence and administration
of a social security system entails for the society and the associated budget implications:
Old age, disability, unemployment and health insurance policies have evolved into the most
expensive items on government budgets.
Most of the studies that seem to emerge as a direct or implicit o¤spring of this debate
focus on the welfare implications of alternative social security schemes in an economy. In
the very core of this debate one can clearly identify the dilemma between an "unfunded"
(Pay-As-You-Go) versus a "funded" social security system. In an unfunded system, re-
sources are transferred statically from the working population to the concurrent retirees
(inter-generational transfers). In contrast, a funded system prescribes a dynamic allocation
of resources within the same generation (inter-temporal within the same generation trans-
fers). While both systems rely on an external institution (e.g. government) in order to
be implemented, their di¤erent logic and mechanics eventually induce entirely di¤erent risk
sharing properties as well as savings incentives. Therefore, their welfare implications may
signicantly di¤er because of this di¤erence.
Population ageing as a result of the declining population growth rate and decreasing
birth rate have challenged enormously the sustainability of a PAYG system and called for a
1This chapter is based on joint work with Cagri S. Kumru
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minimization of the scal burden through tax reforms and benets restructuring. As a result,
there are numerous studies suggesting alternative institutional arrangements that could be
more robust to adverse demographic shocks. However, as much as converting an unfunded
system to a fully (or partially) funded one may seem a plausible solution, in most cases
the transition costs associated with such a reform make it prohibitively costly (De Nardi et
al.(1995) [5]).
The welfare implications of social security are well identied in the relevant literature.2
Several studies (e.g. Storesletten et al. (1999) [32]) comparing di¤erent social security
systems typically compare welfare across alternative steady states, each corresponding to a
stationary equilibrium with a di¤erent social security system. Focusing only on unfunded
social security, Imrohoroglu et al.(1995)[24] emphasize the detrimental e¤ects that such an
arrangement has to the overall welfare in a country.
However, all the above studies ignore alternative preference specications that may be
binding in several cases: Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24] use time-inconsistent preferences and
later Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] use self-control preferences to highlight that in
a context of unfunded social security welfare may be critically a¤ected by the preference
specication. Furthermore, the experimental economics literature documents some evidence
that preferences show some degree of time inconsistency and agents su¤er from temptation,
a fact that further supports the results in the aforementioned studies.3
In this study, we would like to quantitatively assess the welfare implications of the reform
of the current unfunded social security system into a partially funded or fully privatized one,
under the assumption that individuals face self-control problems. We proceed by assessing
in terms of welfare a hybrid (partially funded) social security system under the alternative
hypotheses of self-control or CRRA preferences. The apparatus by means of which we model
departures from unfunded social security is a Personal Security Account (PSA). Within
that class of "funded" models, we investigate two competing scenarios involving PSAs: one
without annuitization and an alternative one that prescribes a mandatory annuitization of
2The interest in the welfare implications of a social security system has been sparked with the seminal
work of Diamond (1965) [7]. The rst quantitative model that assessed the welfare implications of the system
was created by Auerbach & Kotliko¤ (1987) [3].
3For a recent overview of studies that provide evidence that individuals indeed exhibit bias toward im-
mediate gratication see Frederick et al. (2002) [14].
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retirement benets.
Moreover, in order to capture our agentstemptation towards current consumption, our
model economies make use of the preference structure pioneered by Phelps & Pollak (1968)
[31] and further elaborated by Gul & Pesendorfer (2004a) [17] to model self-control issues.
Gul & Pesendorfer (2004a) [17] identied a particular class of utility functions that provide
a time-consistent model suitable for addressing the preference reversals that motivated the
time inconsistency literature. The key theme here is that self-control preferences assume
that agents maximize a utility function that is a compromisebetween the standard utility
(or commitmentutility) and a temptationutility. The conicting ways by which agents
derive utility in this setting, is the device through which the trade o¤between the temptation
to consume on the one hand, and the long-run self interest of the agent on the other is
captured. The main benet is that self-control preferences remain perfectly time-consistent
and, contrary to time-inconsistent preferences, allow agents in our model to commit.
With the exception of the aforementioned di¤erence in the specication of preferences,
our model specication follows that of Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24] and Fuster et al.(2005)
[16]. Furthermore, our economic environment features uninsurable individual income shocks,
borrowing constraints and missing annuity markets.
We aim to contribute to the debate on the reform of social security. Our augmented
model allows us to look at the welfare gains or losses due to the reforms from a di¤erent an-
gle. In particular, it allows us to assess the welfare-enhancing potential of mandatory savings
versus mandatory annuitization of accumulated PSA wealth at retirement. For the sake of
comparability of our results, the particular specication of those alternative policies is pur-
posely chosen to match the proposals analyzed in the literature (Storesletten et al. (1999)[32]
and Fuster et al.(2005)[16]), as well as those featuring in the reform recommendations made
by the 1997 Advisory Council on Social Security.
Moreover, changing the preference structure is very important for theoretical purposes
because it enhances our understanding of the mechanics of similar models in the literature
by providing an additional channel through which capital accumulation is distorted. Equally
importantly, an augmented preference structure is also essential for providing a comprehen-
sive comparison framework for policy makers in their evaluation of various proposals. As
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shown in Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24] and Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] the presence of
slightly far-sighted or current consumption favored agents changes substantially the welfare
implications of the system.
Our results in this paper highlight the important role that self-control preferences play,
especially with regards to the kind of reform that could generate the highest welfare. While
if we restrict our analysis to CRRA preferences our ndings initially conrm those in other
studies (e.g., Fuster et al.(2005)[16]), i.e., we also nd that the complete elimination of any
social security is the policy that maximizes welfare, we come across a drastic alteration of
our results when self-control preferences are introduced: the elimination of social security
still remains, alas marginally, the most desirable policy from the point of view of welfare, it
is nevertheless not as desirable with respect to our alternative reform scenarios as it is under
CRRA preferences. That is, the presence of self-control preferences renders the elimination
scenario less appealing compared to the examined alternatives.
A noteworthy result is that, unlike Fuster et al.(2005)[16], a personal security account
with mandatory annuitization of retirement benets performs worse than a reform scenario
that allows a PSA without annuitization. This is due to the fact that under our parame-
trization (required to converge to the basic stylized facts of the US economy) the stream
of benets that mandatory annuitization entails exposes individuals with self-control prefer-
ences to a respective stream of repeated costs to resist temptation. In our setting, the shape
of the temptation function is such that the total temptation cost from a stream of benets
exceeds the temptation cost from a lump-sum payout at the time of retirement.
Along the same lines, our research indicates that the clear-cut advantage of the elimina-
tion scenario so salient under CRRA preferences fades away as self-control becomes gradually
more severe. Our robustness tests conrm this nding: in the case of severe temptation the
CRRA pecking order is completely reversed, and the elimination of social security becomes
the least desirable scenario.
Under the light of the above ndings, any reform proposal regarding the social security
system should consider departures from standard preferences to preference specications
suitable for dealing with preference reversals.
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4.2 A MODEL OF SOCIAL SECURITY
The model we consider in this section is quite standard in the social security literature. In
particular, our model follows that of Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24].
4.2.1 The Environment
We consider a stationary overlapping generations economy in discrete time. Each period a
new generation is born which is modeled to be n percent larger than the previous generation.
Agents face lives of uncertain duration and some live through the maximum possible life span,
denoted by J . At any given time j within their life-span, all agents have a (time-invariant)
conditional probability sj 2 (0; 1) of surviving from age j   1 to j, conditional on having
survived up to age j   1: Our stationary population assumption implies that age j agents
constitute a fraction j of the population at any given date. The cohort shares fjgJj=1 are
given by
j+1 =
jsj+1
1 + n
while their sum is normalized to 1.
4.2.2 Preferences
Agents in our economy feature self-control preferences. That is, their preferences are such
that in every period they induce a temptation to consume their entire wealth. Resisting
temptation gives rise to a self-control cost; note that the latter feature is absent in models
with CRRA and quasi-hyperbolic preferences. We follow Gul & Pesendorfer (2004a) [17] and
DeJong & Ripoll (2007) [4] and proceed to model self-control preferences recursively.
LetW (x) denote the maximized value of the expected discounted objective function with
state x. The utility function of an agent is as follows:
W (x) = max
c
fu(c) + v(c) + EW (x0)g  max
c
v(c) (4.1)
where E is the expectation operator; u(:) and v(:) are von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions; 0 <  < 1 is a discount factor; c represents the "commitment" consumption; c is
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the "temptation" consumption; and x0 denotes next period state variable. As in the section
above, u(:) represents the momentary utility function and v(:) represents temptation. In
particular, v(c)  max
c
v(c) denotes the disutility from choosing consumption c instead of c.
The concavity or convexity of v(:) turns out to be very important for our analysis.4
The momentary utility, convex temptation and concave temptation functions are assumed
to take the following forms respectively:
u(c) =
c1    1
1   (4.2)
v(c) = 
c

(4.3)
v(c) = u(c) (4.4)
In the specication above, higher values of the scale parameter  > 0, imply an increase
in the share of "temptation" utility, i.e. a higher  increases the importance of current
consumption for an agent. The momentary utility function u(:) is a standard Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) form,  > 0 measures the degree of relative risk aversion
(and 1= the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution).
4.2.3 Production Function
Firms have access to a constant returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas technology that produces
output (Yt) by using labor input (Lt = 0:94
j 1P
j=1
jj ),
5 and capital input (Kt) which is
rented from households:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) = AtK

t L
(1 )
t (4.5)
4Notice that if v(:) is convex, we need to make sure that v(:)+u(:) is stricly concave. In particular,  > 0,
 > 1 and 0 <  < =(c+1c 2) guarantee that u(:) is concave, v(:) is convex and u(:) + v(:) is strictly
concave. When v(:) is concave, one should show that W (:) is strictly concave.
5j denotes the compulsory retirement age and j denotes the e¢ ciency index of an age j agent.
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where At represents the state of technology;  2 (0; 1) is the capitals share of output.
Dening the capital-labor ratio as Kt
Lt
, we can write the production function in the intensive
form as follows:
yt = f(kt) = Atk

t
The technology parameter At grows at a constant rate g and capital depreciates at a constant
rate . Competitive rms in this economy maximize their prots by setting the real rate of
return from asset holdings r and the real wage rate w according to the following:
rt = Atk
 1
t    (4.6)
wt = At(1  )kt (4.7)
Since we are concerned only with the behavior of steady state equlibria , we will hence-
forth drop the time subscript for the rest of the analysis.
4.2.4 Budget Constraints
The exogenously given mandatory retirement age is j. Agents who are younger than age
j face a stochastic employment opportunity at each period j < j. Individuals who nd an
employment opportunity, supply inelastically one unit of labor.6 We denote the employment
state variable by e 2 f0; 1g where 0 and 1 denote unemployment and employment states
respectively. Furthermore, we postulate that the employment state follows a rst-order
Markov process. The transition probability distribution between the current employment
state e and next periods employment state e0 is represented by the 2 2 matrix (e0; e) =
[k0k] where k0; k = 0; 1 and k0k = Prfe0 = k0je = kg.
An employed (e = 1) agent earns wj where w denotes the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit
of labor in terms of the consumption good and j denotes the e¢ ciency index of an age j
agent. If, on the other hand, an agent is unemployed (e = 0), he receives an unemployment
6Adding labor-leisure choice into the model requires the modication of preferences in a way that agents
are not only tempted by current consumption but also by current leisure.
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insurance benet equal to a fraction  of the wage of an employed agent, resulting in the
amount wj;  is the unemployment insurance replacement ratio.
The disposable (after-tax) income of an agent at age j can be written as
qt =
8>>><>>>:
(1   s   u)wj for j = 1; 2; :::; j   1; if e = 1;
wj for j = 1; 2; :::; j   1; if e = 0;
bj for j = j; j + 1; :::; J .
where  s and u represent the social security payroll tax rate and the unemployment insur-
ance tax rate respectively.7
We assume away any private insurance markets against unemployment risk and private
annuitiesmarkets against the risk of outliving ones own resources8. The only available
device to smooth consumption across ones lifetime is the accumulation of assets in terms of
physical capital. Agents cannot hold negative assets at any period.9 Since death is certain
at J and there is no bequest motive, the borrowing constraint can be stated as:108<: aj  0 for j = 1; :::J   1aj = 0 for j = J
7Note that in the US social security system both retirement and unemployment benets are taxed (Dia-
mond & Orszag (2005) [11]). For the sake of less cumbersome notation we refrain from incorporating those
taxes in our analysis.
8Although a market for private annuities exists in the U.S. it is nevertheless very thin (Feldstein &
Liebman (2002) [13], Imrohoroglu et al. (1995) [22]). Hence, our assumption seems innocuous. In our
model, social security partially fullls the role of the missing annuitiesmarket (it can be considered as
mandatory annutization). Diamond et al. (2005) [11] analyze thoroughly the relationship between annuities
and individual welfare. They show that full annuitization of wealth is optimal under certain conditions.
9In other words, an agent faces a borrowing (or liquidity) constraint. Given the size of private credit
markets, this assumption may not seem so innocuous. There are two main reasons behind this assumption:
First, we would like to engage in a careful comparison of our results with those of the existing social security
literature where this assumption is a standard one. Second, the fact that agents are not allowed to borrow
against their future income induces an additional boost in (private) savings for precautionary purposes, since
they may become/remain unemployed with a positive probability. It would be a fair question to explore the
consequences of alleviating this constraint in our environment and allow borrowing against future income. In
that case however, the ability to borrow would lower agentsmarginal propensity to save (for precautionary
reasons), thus implying that the e¤ects of self-control and ability to borrow against future income are highly
correlated; consequently, the e¤ect of social security on savings due to self-control will be non-identiable. In
a recent paper, Rojas & Urrutia (2007) [32] show that adding an endogenous borrowing constraint reduces
the welfare cost of having social security.
10Allowing a bequest motive does change the welfare implications of a social security system. Fuster et al.
(2003) [15] perform a welfare analysis of social security in a dynastic framework and show that steady state
welfare increases with social security.
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We can now proceed to write the growth-adjusted budget constraint of an agent as follows
(1 + g)aj + wj + ct = (1 + r)aj 1 + qj +  (4.8)
(1 + g)aj + wj + cj = (1 + r)aj 1 + qj +  (4.9)
where r is the rate of return from asset holdings and  denotes the amount of accidental
bequests, to be distributed equally to all alive members of the society. The compulsory
contribution/deposit rate for personal security accounts (PSA)  is greater than zero for
employed individuals if PSAs exist in the economy, otherwise,  = 0. The details for the law
of motion of the PSAs are given in the next section.
4.2.5 Social Security and Fiscal Policy
We consider three distinct social security arrangements: Pay-As-You-Go, Personal Security
Accounts without annuitization, and Personal Security Accounts with mandatory annuitiza-
tion. We follow Fuster et al.(2005) [16] as far as our modelling of Personal Security Accounts
is concerned.
4.2.5.1 PAYG A PAYG system in our model economy resembles to that of the US
Economy. Agents retire at age j and receive social security benet b. The social security
benet b is dened as a fraction  of an average life-time employed income, which is, notably,
independent of a particular agents employment history.
b = 
Pj 1
j=1 wj
j 1 for j = j
; j + 1; :::; J .
While technology grows at rate g, the pension payments remain constant during retire-
ment. Therefore, the growth-adjusted pension payments are given as follows:
bj = b
(1+g)j j for j = j
; j + 1; :::; J .
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The social security system is self-nancing and the government administers the program.
We restrict our attention to social security arrangements that are described by the pair
(;  s). The self-nancing conditions are as follows:
 s
j 1X
j=1
X
a
jj(a; e = 1)wj =
JX
j=j
X
a
jj(a; e)bj; (4.10)
where j(a; e) is the set of age dependent, time invariant measures of individuals.
If agents in this economy die before age J , their remaining assets will be distributed
evenly to all of the survivors in a lump-sum fashion as follows:
 =
X
j
X
a
X
e
jj(a; e)(1  sj+1)aj(a; e) (4.11)
4.2.5.2 Personal Security Accounts without Annuitization11 In this section, we
consider a two-tier social security system. The rst tier is a PAYG-nanced universal at
pension benet. The amount of benet is set as 10% of the per capita gross domestic product
(GDP). As in the above benchmark case, the rst tier is self-nancing and administered by
the government.
j 1
 s
X
j=1
X
a
jj(a; e = 1)wj =
JX
j=j
X
a
jj(a; e)b

where b = 0:10y and y = w=(1  ).
Hence, the equilibrium tax rate can be found by using the equation below:
 s =
0:10
1  
JP
j=j
P
a
jj(a; e)
j 1P
j=1
P
a
jj(a; e = 1)j
The second tier of retirement benets is nanced through mandatory savings. In this
setting, employed individuals are required to deposit 2:7% of their earnings into their pri-
vately managed personal savings account. The funds on PSA earn the tax-free rate of return
on capital and they cannot be withdrawn until the mandatory retirement age. Individuals
11We will henceforth refer to to the system presented in this section as PSA.
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second-tier benets depend on the funds accumulated in their PSAs. The law of motion for
the PSA is the following:
(1 + g){j+1 = (1 + r){j + wj, (4.12)
{1 = 0;
where  = 0:027 is the required deposit rate and {j+1 denotes an age j + 1 individuals
accumulated PSA funds. Individuals receive a lump-sum transfer of funds accumulated in
their PSAs when they are retired at age j. Hence, retirement benets can be written as
follows:
bj =
8<: b + (1 + r){j, for j = jb
(1+g)j j , otherwise
If an individual dies before ones retirement, the accumulated funds in his PSA account
are distributed to the remaining members of the society in a lump-sum fashion along with
their assets:
 =
X
j
X
a
X
e
jj(a; e)(1  sj+1)[aj(a; e) + {j(e)] (4.13)
4.2.5.3 Personal Security Accounts with Mandatory Annuitization12 We con-
sider a two-tier pension system here as well. While the rst tier is exactly the same as
that of the previous section, the second tier di¤ers. The government annuitizes funds ac-
cumulated in individualsPSAs and hence, individuals receive annuity payments equal to
b0 = p(1 + r){j, where p denotes the proportion, i.e., the amount of an annuity payment
received by an individual, which is obviously proportional to the accumulated funds in his
PSA account, and is determined endogenously.
The government sets the proportion p in such a way that the expected present value
of the aggregate annuity payments of the generation that retires now ( E) is equal to the
funds held in PSAs, including the funds of individuals from the same generation who died
12We will henceforth refer to to the system presented in this section as PSA+Annuity.
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before their retirement. The expected present value of the aggregate annuity payments of
the generation that retires now is equal to the following:
E = p(1 + r){j
JX
j=j
(1 + r)j
 j
j 1Y
i=1
i:
The aggregate funds of the individuals from the same generation who survived to retirement
and who died before their retirement are given as
(1 + r){j
j 1Y
i=1
i
and
(1 + r)
jX
j=2
(
1 + r
1 + g
)j
 j{j(1  j 1)
j 2Y
i=1
i
respectively. Hence, the proportion p can be written as follows:
p =
(1 + r){j
j 1Y
i=1
i + (1 + r)
jX
j=2
( 1+r
1+g
)j
 j{j(1  j 1)
j 2Y
i=1
i
(1 + r){j
PJ
j=j(1 + r)
j j
j 1Y
i=1
i
(4.14)
Because individualssurvival rates do not depend on their types in our model economy, the
above return is actuarially fair, it could be o¤ered by private rms and there is no need
for government intervention. Yet, in our model, the private annuity market is closed by
assumption and hence the government has to administer it. If individuals survival rates
were type-dependent, the above equation would yield an actuarially not fair premium. This,
in turn, would call for government intervention because adverse selection issues would cause
a market breakdown.
The law of motion of the funds aggregated in PSA by the government is the following:
(1 + n)(1 + g)zt+1 = (1 + r)zt + wL B0;
where  = 0:027 is the social security tax rate, L = 0:94
j 1X
j=1
jj is the aggregate labor
supply, and B0 =
JX
j=j
b0(1 + g)j
 jj is the aggregate annuity payment at time t.
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Hence, the expression for retirement benets featuring PSAs under a mandatory annu-
itization scheme can be written as follows:
bj =
b + b0
(1 + g)j j
for j = j; :::; J:
In addition to a social security program, the government also runs a self-nancing unem-
ployment program. The self-nancing condition for the unemployment insurance program is
as follows:
u
j 1X
j=1
X
a
jj(a; e = 1)wj =
j 1X
j=1
X
a
jj(a; e = 0)wj; (4.15)
where  is the unemployment insurance replacement rate.
4.2.6 An Agents Dynamic Program
We assume that the temptation function v(:) is strictly increasing, i.e., an agent is tempted
to consume his entire wealth in each period. This implies that the agent maximizes the
second part of equation (4.1) by holding zero assets for the next period, i.e., setting aj = 0
in equation (4.9). In this economy, the agents state vector x contains the current asset
holdings and the employment state. Hence, we can write the agents dynamic program for
any arbitrary two periods as follows:
W (x) = max
c
fu(c) + v(c) + Es0W (x0)g   v((1 + r)a+ q + ) (4.16)
subject to
a0 + c = (1 + r)a+ q + , a0  0, a0 is given. (4.17)
where Es0 denotes the expectation over survival probabilities.
If the agent succumbs to a temptation and consumes his entire wealth, the term v(c) 
v((1 + r)a + q + ) in the equation above cancels out. When he resists to temptation and
consumes less than his wealth, he faces a self-control cost at the amount of v(c)   v((1 +
r)a + q + ). The agent tries to balance his urge for utility from current consumption v(c)
and long-term commitment utility u(c) + Es0W (x0).
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4.2.7 Steady State Equilibrium
In our characterization of the steady state equilibrium, we follow Imrohoroglu et al.(2003)[24]
and Hugget & Ventura (1999)[21].
Given a set of government policy f; ;  s; u; g; a steady state recursive competitive
equilibrium is a set of value functions fWj(x)gJj=1, household policy rules faj(x)gJj=1, time-
invariant measures of agents fj(x)gJj=1, wage and interest rate (w; r), and a lump-sum
distribution of accidental bequests  such that all of them satisfy the following:
 Factor prices (w; r) that are derived from the rms rst-order conditions satisfy equations
(4.6) and (4.7).
 Given the government policy set f; ;  s; u; g, the factor prices (w; r); and the lump-
sum transfer of accidental bequests , an agents policy rule faj(x)gJj=1 solves the agents
maximization problem (4.16) subject to the budget constraint (4.17).
 Aggregation holds,
K =
X
j
X
a
X
e
jj(x)[aj 1(x) + {j]: (4.18)
 The set of age-dependent, time-invariant measures of agents satises in every period t
j(x
0) =
X
e
X
a
(e0; e)t 1(x) (4.19)
where 1 is given.
 The lump-sum distribution of accidental bequests  satises the equation (4.11) if the
PAYG or PSA+Annuity programs are in use, or else it satises the equation (4.13) if the
PSA program is in use.
 Both the social security system and the unemployment insurance benet program are
self-nancing.
 The market clears
X
j
X
a
X
e
jj(x)[aj(x) + {j(x) + cj(x)] (4.20)
= Y + (1  )
X
j
X
a
X
e
jj(x)[aj 1(x) + {j 1(x)]
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4.3 CALIBRATION
In this section, we briey dene the parameter values of our model. Each period in our
model corresponds to a calendar year.
4.3.1 Demographic and Labor Market Parameters
Agents are born at a real life age of 21(model age of 1) and they can live up to a maximum
real life age of 85 (model age of 65). The population growth rate n is assumed to be
equal to the average U.S. population growth rate between 1931-2003 which corresponds, on
average, to 1:19% per year13. The sequence of conditional survival probabilities is the same
as the Social Security Administrations sequence of survival probabilities for men in the year
2001. The mandatory retirement age is equal to 65 (model age 45). In order to set the
e¢ ciency index, we choose the average of Hansens (1993)[20] estimation of median wage
rates for males and females for each age group. We interpolate the data by using the Spline
Method and normalize the interpolated data to average unity. The employment transition
probabilities are chosen to be compatible with the average unemployment rate in the U.S.
which is approximately equal to 0:06 between 1948 and 2003:14 The implied employment
transition matrix assumes the following form:
(e; e0) =
240:94 0:06
0:94 0:06
35 :
4.3.2 Preference Parameters
We choose the values of preference parameters ; ;  and  in such a way that our model
economys capital-output ratio matches that of the U.S. economy.
In the case where the temptation function v(:) is convex, we choose to follow Imrohoroglu
et al.(2003) [24] and DeJong & Ripoll (2007) [4], in letting  be centered at 2 with a standard
deviation 1, i.e.,  = 2(1). In our benchmark calibration, we initially set  = 2, and then
13The population data were obtained from the U. S. Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau (2006)) [37] .
14The unemployment data are taken from the U. S. Department of Labor (U.S. Department of Labor
(2006)). [36]
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check the robustness of our results by letting  = 3. Holding  constant, we choose di¤erent
values of  a priori, and calculate the corresponding  in such a way that u(:) + v(:) stays
a strictly concave function. For every triple ;  and , we search over the values of 
that deliver the capital-output ratio which is compatible with its empirical counterpart. We
assume that the social security replacement ratio is 50% and the unemployment replacement
ratio is 25% during our search.
When the temptation function is concave, we follow DeJong & Ripoll (2007) [4] and set
 = 0:0786(0:056)
4.3.3 Production Parameters
The parameters describing the production side of the economy are chosen to match the long-
run features of the U.S. economy. Following Imrohoroglu et al.(2003)[24], we set the capital
share of output  equal to 0:310 and the annual depreciation rate of physical capital equal
to 0:069. The rate of technological progress g is assumed to be equal to 2:1%; which is the
actual average growth rate of GDP per capita taken over the time interval from 1959 to 1994
(Hugget & Ventura (1999) [20]. The technology parameter A; can be chosen freely. In our
calibration exercises, it is set equal to 1:01. All per capita quantities are assumed to grow
at a constant rate g.
4.3.4 Government
We set the unemployment insurance replacement ratio () equal to 25% of the employed
wage. In the benchmark case, we set the social security replacement ratio () equal to 50%.
Alternatively, we can choose the payroll tax rate ( s) and the unemployment insurance tax
rate (u) instead of the replacement ratios. Since the social security and the unemployment
insurance benets are self-nancing, calibrating the replacement ratios will automatically
pin-down the tax rates. This holds true because agents inelastically supply one unit of labor
whenever they nd an opportunity to work, and changes in tax rates do not a¤ect their
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supply of labor.15 In the PSA cases, the rst tier universal benets are set equal to 10%
of per capita GDP and the social security tax rate for second tier benets  is set equal to
2:7%.
4.3.5 Solution Method
We use discrete-time, discrete-state optimization techniques to nd a steady state equilibrium
of our hypothetical economy by using the aforementioned parameter values. Our solution
method designedly resembles those of previous studies.16
A discrete set of asset values (containing 4097 points) is created. The lower bound and
upper bound of the set are chosen in such a way that the set never binds.17 While the state
space for working age agents comprises 4097  2 points, the state space for retired agents
consists of only 4097  1 points (since there is no state transition after j).The discrete
set of the control variable (consumption) contains 4097  1 points. We start with a guess
about the aggregate capital stock and the level of accidental bequests and then solve agents
dynamic program by backward recursion. The time-invariant, age-dependent distribution of
agents is obtained by forward recursion. After each loop, we calculate the new values for the
accidental bequests and the capital stock. If the di¤erence between the initial values and
the new values exceed the tolerance value, we start a new loop with the new values. This
procedure continues until we nd values for the accidental bequests and the capital stock
that are su¢ ciently close to their beginning-of-loop values.
4.4 RESULTS
In this section we rst calibrate our model economy to the US data under the assumption
that individuals have CRRA preferences and a PAYG system that is similar to that of the
US is in use. We choose the social security replacement rate as 40% since it corresponds
15However, if we calibrate a model featuring labor-leisure choice, tax rates should be used instead of
replacement rates.
16See Imrohoroglu et al. (1995 [22] and 2003 [24]) and Hugget & Ventura(1999)[21].
17In particular, the lower bound is equal to 0 and the upper bound is equal to 60 times greater than the
annual income of an employed agent.
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to the current average social security replacement rate in the US. Our aim is to gradually
converge to the long term average of the US capital-output ratio of 2:5. Subsequently, we
proceed to look at the implications of three reform proposals:
The rst reform proposal postulates the substitution of the current social security system
by a two-tier scheme: a universal PAYG-nanced basic pension combined with a Personal
Security Account that does not require annuitization of benets at retirement.
The second reform proposal is similar to the rst one except that it prescribes a manda-
tory annuitization of the funds accumulated in PSA accounts.
Finally, the third reform proposal suggests the complete removal of the social security
system; in terms of our model, this amounts to postulating that the social security replace-
ment ratio is equal to zero.
The e¤ects that the three competing scenarios have on economic aggregates, as well as
their welfare implications are given in Table 17 for the case of a CRRA population. The
welfare implications of a given policy are measured in terms of the average expected utility
(EU). The average expected utility of a policy is given in the last column of Table 17. Both
our rst reform proposal (featuring as "PSA" in Table 17) and our second one (featuring as
"PSA + Annuity" in Table 17) prescribe a specic (given) rate of mandatory savings. We
assume that the mandatory savings rate, denoted by , is equal to 2:7% of the gross individual
labor income. As a consequence, individualspayments to the social security system across
PAYG, PSA, and PSA + Annuity policies are all equalized. It is a well established result in
the literature that funded or partially funded social security systems induce an increase in
capital accumulation as well as in other aggregate variables such as consumption and output.
(e.g., Storesletten et al. (1999) [32]). However, the exact magnitudes of increase of those
aggregate variables are sensitively dependent to the features of the model. As demonstrated
in Fuster et al.(2005) [16] the increases in the absolute levels of aggregate variables are
more moderate in an economy populated by altruistic individuals compared to an economy
without altruistic individuals. Previous studies (Imrohoroglu et al.(1995) [24], Imrohoroglu
et al.(2003) [24], and Hugget & Ventura (1999) [20]) also demonstrated that decreasing the
social security replacement rate improves the social welfare whenever individuals have CRRA
preferences. Their key nding was that the complete elimination of a PAYG system would
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deliver the highest social welfare.
Our results in Table 17 are consistent with those of previous studies mentioned above.
Since both PSA and PSA + Annuity reform proposals entail less distortion on savings, some-
thing that comes as a consequence of a low level of payroll tax, the level of capital stock in
both cases is higher than that of a PAYG system. Not surprisingly, the complete elimination
of a PAYG system induces a higher capital stock compared to that of PAYG. Capital stock
levels in PSA and PSA+Annuity reforms are higher than in the elimination scenario because
individuals cannot borrow against the funds accumulated in their PSA accounts, even if it
might be optimal to do so for consumption smoothing purposes. Interestingly, and unlike
Fuster et al.(2005) [16], the PSA reform generates higher capital stock compared to the PSA
+ Annuity reform.
An immediate interpretation of this discrepancy lies in the fact that under the PSA +
Annuity scenario analyzed in Fuster et al.(2005) [16] the funds of the deceased are invested in
the capital market while under the PSA scenario they are transferred to the estates, resulting
in a higher capital stock in the former scenario. In our model instead, annuity payments force
individuals to reduce their post-retirement savings and hence, the gain in the level of capital
stock from the increased investment in the capital market is o¤set by the reduced post-
retirement savings. The complete elimination of social security scenario induces the highest
welfare improvement followed by the PSA reform. This happens because the elimination
reform allows individuals to engage in consumption smoothing more e¢ ciently than the
other proposed reforms.
The large and growing literature on time inconsistency and self-control issues suggests
that preference specications capturing individuals self-control problems might provide
richer insights to the observed behavior of individuals (for example see Frederick et al.(2002)).
Needless to say, both time inconsistent preferences à la Phelps & Pollak (1968) [31] and self-
control preferences à la Gul & Pesendorfer (2004a) [17] have been extensively used in an
attempt to shed light to various macroeconomic problems, with issues pertaining to social
security being among the most prominent ones.
More specically, while Imrohoroglu et al.(2003) [24] analyze the welfare implications
of the elimination of a PAYG-type social security system in an economy populated by
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individuals with time inconsistent preferences, Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] analyze the
same policy proposal in an economy populated by individuals with self-control preferences.
The latter study concludes that the welfare implications of the elimination of the PAYG
system may vary drastically even if individualsself-control problems di¤er only to a small
extent.
Although the elimination of a PAYG social security system is one policy option, trans-
forming the system into a partially or fully-funded one could very well be policy alternatives
worth investigating. The types of PSA and PSA+ Annuity policies we analyze in this paper
are similar to the ones analyzed Storesletten et al. (1999) [32] and Fuster et al.(2005) [16]
and those proposed in the reform recommendations made by the 1997 Advisory Council on
Social Security18. In what follows, we proceed to examine the implications of the above
reform proposals under the assumption that individuals have self-control preferences. Before
presenting our results for the benchmark case, we rst explain the behavioral implications
of the existence of temptation and then quantify the e¤ects of temptation on economic
aggregates.
Following DeJong & Ripoll (2007)[4], Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] calculated the
quantity of steady state consumption that would have to be given up by a self-control
individual in order to escape from temptation; Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) [29] showed
that individuals would be willing to forgo as much as 4:82% of their steady state consumption
in order to eliminate temptation. This clearly demonstrates the welfare reducing e¤ect that
a self-control problem entails.
Next, we quantify steady state levels of capital accumulation and consumption under the
assumption that individuals have self-control preferences. By keeping the annual discount
factor at its CRRA level, we rst x  at 2 and vary  then we x  at 0:00009 and vary
. Tables 18 and 19 display our results for both cases. The results are the same as those in
Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008)[29] . Table 3 demonstrates that an increase in the intensity
of temptation distorts capital accumulation severely and causes a reduction in steady state
consumption. Similarly, Table 4 shows the e¤ects of an increase in an individuals willingness
18Please see Fuster et al 2005 [16] for a detailed exposition of the reform proposals regarding to the US
social security system.
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to substitute current temptation consumption with future temptation consumption. Higher
values of  mean that individuals prefer more current temptation consumption. Not surpris-
ingly, higher values of  result in a reduction in the steady state level of capital, which in
turn causes a reduction in the steady state level of consumption.
In this section we present our results for an economy in which agents have self-control
preferences and we compare the e¤ects of the aforementioned three reform proposals on
both economic aggregates and social welfare. Our model provides the opportunity to com-
pare the e¤ects of two opposite factors on savings (capital accumulation). While the exis-
tence/availability of PSAs causes an increase in savings, individuals with self-control prefer-
ences save less in order to escape from the huge self-control cost associated with resisting to
temptation once the accumulated assets become available. We present our results in Table
20. The e¤ects of the three reform proposals on economic aggregates and social welfare are
similar to those we documented in Table 17 for an economy populated by individuals featur-
ing CRRA preferences. In particular, the highest level of capital stock is reached under the
PSA reform scenario whereas the highest level of average expected utility is achieved under
the complete elimination scenario. The mechanisms that deliver these results are the same
as those we explained in the case of the CRRA case above. However, a careful look at Table
20 reveals that, unlike the CRRA case, the values of average expected utilities across our
four scenarios are very close to each other.
For the sake of a more concise comparison, we created Table 21; this table presents
the levels of capital stock and average expected utility under the three alternative reform
proposals for both CRRA and self-control cases. In this table the values of the level of capital
stock and the average expected utility induced by the CRRA model are normalized to 100
and  100 respectively. Table 21 reveals that only the elimination and PSA reform scenarios
yield higher welfare in the case agents feature self-control preferences. However, the welfare
benets of these scenarios are substantially lower compared to the case where agents have
CRRA preferences. The intuition is the following: Individuals with self-control preferences
are tempted to consume their entire wealth each period. Payroll taxes help those individuals
to reduce their cost of exerting self-control in order to resist temptation. This additional
benet of a PAYG system creates welfare improvement.
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Still, this additional benet of a PAYG system is not large enough to exceed the benets
associated with eliminating the entire social security system. The PSA reforms provide the
same additional benet to working age individuals as the PAYG system. Although under
CRRA preferences the elimination scenario results in a welfare gain that is considerably
higher than the PSA scenario, the welfare benets for both the elimination and PSA scenar-
ios are almost identical under self-control preferences. Table 21 demonstrates an intriguing
result: PSA + Annuity reduces the overall welfare. This is a surprising result. Fuster
et al.(2005)[16] showed that PSA+Annuity on average generated the highest welfare in an
altruistic economy in which individuals have CRRA preferences. In our environment the
PSA+Annuity reform does not work. The reason why this obtains is simple: after retire-
ment the PSA+Annuity reform provides more consumption opportunities, and hence higher
exposure to temptation than what an individual with a self-control problem prefers. This
higher the retirement benet is the more it exacerbates the retired individualsself-control
costs and the more likely it becomes for it to exceed the additional benet provided to the
working age agents. More specically, the stream of benets that mandatory annuitization
entails exposes individuals with self-control preferences to a respective stream of repeated
costs to resist temptation. In our setting, the shape of the temptation function is such
that the total temptation cost from a stream of benets exceeds the temptation cost from a
lump-sum payo¤ at the time of retirement.
Finally we check the robustness of our results for the case where individuals face an
extremely severe self-control problem. For this purpose we set the risk-aversion parameter of
the momentary utility function, , equal to 2 and we set the temptation function parameters
 and  equal to 2 and 0:00065 respectively. We choose  = 1:0117 in order to converge
to the long-term capital-output ratio of the US economy when a PAYG system is in use19.
Table 22 below presents the results of our robustness test.
As it can be seen in Table 22, in contrast to our previous results, the current PAYG
system dominates all other systems by generating the highest overall welfare, while the
19Further robustness checks were conducted by using various parameter choices. All these exercises conrm
our results and they are available upon request. We also conduct exercises by using a concave tamptation
function. As long as the self-control problem is not very severe, our results do not signicantly deviate from
the CRRA case. In order to keep the number of pages reasonable we dont present the results here. They
are also available upon request.
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elimination reform creates the lowest level of welfare. Since PSA and PSA + Annuity
reforms provide the same additional benet as PAYG, it is not surprising that in the case of
severe temptation they end-up performing better than the elimination scenario.
Still, higher retirement benets increase retireesself-control cost and hence both PSA
and PSA + Annuity reforms underperform with regards to welfare compared to PAYG in
this environment. A higher value of the time preference parameter, , might be e¤ective in
delivering the above results. Nevertheless, these results are important in that they blatantly
manifest how sensitive are the welfare consequences of various reform proposals to little
deviations from the CRRA case.
In summary, we show that if an economy is populated by individuals with self-control
problems, the gain from the two reform proposals is not as large as what we observed in the
CRRA case. More interestingly the PSA + Annuity reform proposal even decreases welfare
in comparison to the PAYG system.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
Population aging due to low birth and morbidity rates and the resulting expansion of social
security benets have prompted lively debates around the long-term viability of unfunded
social security.20 Several reform proposals are being discussed for the US Economy and other
industrialized countries, most of which converge to a common resultant: social security must
be reformed in the direction of a funded rather than an unfunded system.
In this paper we examine departures from a Pay-As-You-Go social security system to-
wards a system consisting of two parts: A "dened benets" component and a "dened
contributions" one. This is implemented by means of annexing a (individually managed)
Personal Security Account to a universal (PAYG-based) pension system.
We quantitatively assess the attractiveness (i.e., the welfare enhancing potential) of such
a funded scheme in an economy populated by agents that face self-control issues. To this
purpose, we use two di¤erent benchmarks: a economy featuring PAYG social security popu-
20See US Social Security Administration.2008. Fast facts and gures about social security.
<http://www.ssa.gov> [35]
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lated by self-control agents (Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008)[29] ) and an economy featuring
funded (as in this paper) social security but populated by CRRA agents. Furthermore,
we rene our analysis by investigating the relative appeal of two distinct scenarios: PSAs
without annuitization and PSAs with mandatory annuitization.
Our analysis suggests that the availability of PSAs increases savings "in general". This is
principally true for CRRA agents. However, it is very ambiguous whether self-control agents
will be better o¤ with a genuine PAYG system, or with a funded system of the analyzed
hybrid structure that prescribes mandatory annuitization, as it eventually depends on the
intensity of the self-control problem.
Our results in this paper highlight the important role that self-control preferences play,
especially with regards to the kind of reform that could generate the highest welfare. While
when the analysis is restricted to CRRA preferences our ndings initially conrm those in
other studies (e.g., Fuster et al.(2005)[16]), i.e., we also nd that the complete elimination
of any social security is the policy that maximizes welfare, when self-control preferences are
introduced instead, we come across a drastic alteration of our results: the elimination of social
security still remains, alas very marginally, the most desirable policy from the point of view
of welfare maximization, it is nevertheless not as desirable with respect to our alternative
reform scenarios as it is under CRRA preferences.
A noteworthy result is that, unlike Fuster et al.(2005)[16], the PSA + Annuity scenario
performs worse than the reform scenario that allows a PSA without mandatory annuitization.
It is true that in the latter case, the prospect of a lump-sum PSA payout to self-control agents
may entail an innitely cumbersome cost of resisting temptation, but this eventully hinges
on the curvature of the temptation function. Interestingly enough, even when PSA benets
are annuitized, this amounts to a stream of smaller in magnitude temptation problems in the
post-retirement period. It turns out that in our setting, the shape of the temptation function
is such that the total temptation cost from a stream of benets exceeds the temptation cost
from a lump-sum payout at the time of retirement. Hence, mandatory annuitization becomes
less desirable to our self-control agents.
In conclusion, our research indicates that the incontestable advantage of the elimination
scenario under CRRA preferences rapidly vanishes as self-control is introduced and becomes
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progressively more severe. Our robustness tests conrm this nding: in the case of severe
temptation the CRRA pecking order is completely reversed, and the elimination of social
security becomes the least desirable reform scenario.
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Table 16: Parameter Values of The Benchmark Calibration
Demographics
Maximum possible life span T 65
Obligatory retirement age t 45
Growth rate of population n 1:19%
Conditional survival probabilities fstgTt=1 U.S. 2001
Labor e¢ ciency prole fjgt 1t=1 Hansen (1993)
Production
Capital share of GDP  0:310
Annual depreciation of capital stock  0:069
Annual per capita output growth rate g 2:1%
Markov Process for employment transition 
240:94 0:06
0:94 0:06
35
Preferences
Annual discount factor of utility  0:998
Scale factor of the temptation utility  0:000375
Risk aversion parameter  2:0
Risk loving parameter  2:0
Government
Unemployment insurance replacement ratio  0:25
Social security replacement ratio  [0; 1]
Compulsory deposit rate  0:027
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Table 17: CRRA Preferences
 s(%) (%) K Y C K=Y r(%) EU
PAYG 4.58 0 3.082 1.228 0.974 2.511 7.95 -26.114
PSA 1.88 2.70 3.691 1.298 0.961 2.843 6.51 -25.608
PSA+Annuity 1.88 2.70 3.590 1.287 0.949 2.789 6.72 -25.936
Elimination 0 0 3.562 1.284 0.984 2.774 6.78 -24.932
Table 18: (beta=0.978, gamma=2, rho=2)
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 0:0004 1:120 2:386 0:939 2:132 0:103 0:984
 = 0:001 1:067 2:046 0:918 1:917 0:122 0:938
Table 19: (beta=0.978, lambda=0.00009)
 Y K C K=Y r w
CRRA 1:188 2:892 0:960 2:434 0:081 1:044
 = 2 1:168 2:735 0:954 2:342 0:087 1:026
 = 3 1:075 2:091 0:922 1:946 0:119 0:944
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Table 20: Self-Control Preferences
 s(%) (%) K Y C K=Y r(%) EU
PAYG 4.58 0 2.765 1.187 0.960 2.330 8.91 -34.666
PSA 1.88 2.70 3.410 1.267 0.954 2.692 7.12 -34.288
PSA+Annuity 1.88 2.70 3.330 1.257 0.939 2.648 7.31 -34.748
Elimination 0 0 3.109 1.231 0.969 2.526 7.88 34.244
Table 21: Comparison
CRRA Self-Control
K EU K EU
PAYG 100  100 100  100
PSA 119:760  98:062 123:327  98:910
PSA+Annuity 116:483  99:318 119:349  100:237
Elimination 115:574  95:500 112:441  98:783
Table 22: Severe Temptation
 s(%) (%) K Y C K=Y r(%) EU
PAYG 4.58 0 2.783 1.189 0.961 2.340 8.86 -47.626
PSA 1.88 2.70 3.436 1.270 0.955 2.706 7.06 -48.202
PSA+Annuity 1.88 2.70 3.365 1.262 0.940 2.668 7.22 -48.812
Elimination 0 0 3.094 1.229 0.968 2.517 7.92 48.979
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